addition, the State must prove that either (a) the death
was not so remote in its occurrence as not to have a just
bearing on the defendant’s liability, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
9b(2)(a), or (b) the death was so dependent on the
conduct of another person unrelated to the injection,
inhalation, or ingestion of the substance or its effect as not
to have a just bearing on the defendant’s liability.
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9b(2)(b).
This statute was held to be constitutional in all
respects. See State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536 (1994);
State v. Ervin, 242 N.J. Super. 584 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 122 N.J. 400 (1990).
While the Legislature retained the “not too remote”
defense, the defense differs from that of felony-murder in
that the victim’s volitional actions in using the drugs may
not be considered. State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. at 572.
However, in cases where the victim’s action in taking the
drugs are not voluntary or volitional, a remoteness
defense may lie. Id. at 572, n.5.
In a juvenile case where the defendant purchased,
prepared and distributed PCP to the victim and then left
her lying in a stupor on railroad tracks where she was later
killed by a train, it was held that sufficient evidence
existed for finding probable cause that the juvenile caused
the victim’s death. State in the Interest of A.J., 232 N.J.
Super. 274, 282-90 (App. Div. 1989).
COMPLICITYCOMPLICITYCOMPLICITYCOMPLICITYCOMPLICITY (See also, ACCOMPLICE
LIABILITY, CONSPIRACY, this Digest)
Complicity under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 imposes liability
upon one person for the conduct of another person under
circumstances where one is accountable for the other’s
conduct. State v. Ishaque, 312 N.J. Super. 207, 211 (App.
Div. 1997). Unlike conspiracy which is defined as an
independent crime under N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, there exists
no independent crime of complicity under the code. To
the contrary, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 expresses a general
principle of criminal liability. An individual indicted
under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6, in conjunction with the
substantive offense, is provided appropriate notice of the
factual theory underlying the charges. An individual
adjudicated guilty under such a charge is guilty of the
substantive offense, and liable for punishment as if he
were the principle perpetrator. State v. Bram, 246 N.J.
Super. 200, 207 (Law Div. 1990).Although N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 sets forth “the different
modes of complicity in an offense * * * [i]t does not * * *
contemplate that such distinctions should have a
procedural significance.” Accordingly, the alternative
theories of criminal-conduct responsibility do not
constitute elements of a crime. Ordinarily, indictments
need not specify a theory of criminal-conduct
responsibility. Although murder indictments must
specify whether the murder is alleged to have been
committed by the defendant’s own conduct, R. 3:7-3(b),
the purpose of that requirement is only to indicate
whether the alleged crime is one punishable by death.
Accordingly, the accepted view is that to return a criminal
conviction, a jury need not be unanimous on the theory
of criminal-conduct responsibility if the alternative
theories apply to commission of the same criminal act and
each of them supports conviction of the same offense.
State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 520 (1994).In a capital murder prosecution, the jury’s verdict
that defendant was guilty of the purposeful and knowing
murder required the jury to have determined that
defendant was responsible for the murder beyond a
reasonable doubt, either by his own conduct, as an
accomplice, or as a co-conspirator, but did not require
unanimity on the specific theory of liability. Thus, the
possibility of a non-unanimous verdict on the own-
conduct requirement remained a possibility after the jury
decided defendant’s guilt on the murder charges. State v.
Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 522 (1994).