N.J. Super. 315, 330 (App. Div.1971), certif. denied, 60
N.J. 138 (1972).
Frequently, it is the most difficult task for a jury to
determine whether an illicit agreement has been made
and whether one acted in furtherance of the conspiracy.
This is so, primarily, because “silence, furtiveness and
secrecy shroud the conduct and speech of coconspira-
tors.” State v. Phelps, 96 N.J. 500, 509 (1984).
Therefore, a jury verdict that there was no conspiracy to
rob or to murder quite conceivably resulted from a belief
that the State failed to establish an illicit agreement. See
State v. Hardison, supra, 99 N.J. at 383.
“[T]he gravamen of the crime of conspiracy is the
criminal agreement.” State v. Ball, 141 N.J. 142, 178
(1995). A conspiracy conviction does not turn on ‘doing
the act, nor effecting the purpose for which the
conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to do them, nor
in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the
scheme or agreement....’” Id., citing State v. Carbone, 10
N.J. 329, 337 (1952).
A conspiracy is distinct from the substantive offense
committed pursuant to the conspiracy. Both the
conspiracy and object offense may be charged in an
indictment. State v. Cormier, 46 N.J. 494, 501 (1966);
State v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 1983),
certif. denied, 94 N.J. 531 (1983). Note, however, that
a defendant may not be convicted of both the conspiracy
to commit only one substantive offense and that
substantive offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8a(2). See also State v.
Hardison, 99 N.J. 379 (1985) (if a conspiracy has
multiple objectives, the conspiracy conviction should not
merge with a conviction for one of the completed object
offenses.)
The offense of conspiracy is complete upon
agreement to commit the offense; it is irrelevant whether
or not the substantive offense is completed. N.J.S.A.
2C:5-2a; State v. LaFera, 35 N.J. 75, 86 (1961).
II. SCOPE OF THE CONSPIRACY
A. Generally
A conspirator is liable for all acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy. State v. Louf, 64 N.J. 172, 176 (1973).
If a conspirator knows that a person with whom he
has conspired to commit a crime has conspired with
another person(s) to commit the same crime, he is guilty
of conspiracy with such other persons, whether or not he
knows their identity. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2b; State v. New
Jersey Trade Waste Ass’n, 96 N.J. 828 (1984); State v.
Carbone, 10 N.J. 329, 338 (1954).Conspirators do not have to know each other, they
need not have personal knowledge of the outcome of the
plan, and they do not have to join in the common purpose
at the same time. State v. Ball, 141 N.J. at 178-79. The
agreement does not have to be formal or express and may
be inferred from the facts and circumstances. State v.
Kamienski, 254 N.J. Super. at 94; see also, State v. General
Restoration Co., 42 N.J. 366, 375-76 (1964).Thus, as under pre-Code law, “[i]t may be that the
alleged conspirators have never seen each other, and have
never corresponded. One may have never heard the name
of the other, and yet by the law they may be parties to the
same common criminal agreement.” State v. Roldan, 314
N.J. Super. 173, 180 (App. Div. 1998), quoting State v.
Carbone, 10 N.J. at 338.B. Unilateral Conspiracy
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-3a provides in pertinent part that “it
is immaterial to the liability of a person who conspires
with another to commit a crime that (1) ... the person
with whom he conspires does not occupy a particular
position or have a particular characteristic which is an
element of such crime, if [the alleged conspirator]
believes that [the purported co- conspirator] does; or
(2)[t]he person with whom he conspires ... has an
immunity to prosecution or conviction for the
commission of the crime.” This definition “departs from
the traditional notion of conspiracy as an entirely
bilateral or multilateral relationship.... Attention is
directed instead to each individual’s culpability by
framing the definition in terms of the conduct that
suffices to establish the liability of any given actor, rather
than the conduct of a group of which he is charged to be
a part—an approach that the Drafters of the [Model
Penal] Code designate as ‘unilateral.’” State v. Roldan,
314 N.J. Super. at 180, quoting State v. Del Fino, 100 N.J.
154, 160 (1985). Under this unilateral approach to
conspiratorial liability, a person may be guilty of
conspiracy even though the other party to the criminal
agreement is an undercover police officer or police
informant who has no intention of actually committing
a crime. See State v. Urcinoli, 321 N.J. Super. 519, 538
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 132 (1999); State v.