“A ‘single crime of conspiracy may include several
unlawful objects of that conspiracy,’ as long as the acts
relate to a single transaction or common plan.” State v.
New Jersey Trade Waste Association, 96 N.J. 8, 21 (1984),
citing State v. Witte, 13 N.J. 598, 605 (1953); see also
State v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. 273, 299 (App. Div.
1983), certif. denied, 94 N.J. 531 (1983).
IV. OVERT ACTS
When the State prosecutes a defendant for conspiracy
to commit a first or second degree crime, it need not prove
that a defendant committed an overt act in pursuance of
the conspiracy. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2d. Thus, when the
defendant is convicted of conspiracy to commit first and
second degree crimes, the sufficiency of the evidence as to
the commission of an overt act is not at issue. Id. The only
question is whether a reasonable jury, viewing the State’s
evidence in its most favorable light, could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendants, acting with a
purposeful state of mind, agreed to commit, attempted to
commit, or aided in the commission of an aggravated
sexual assault. State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 401
(App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 466 (1997).
When a defendant is charged with conspiracy to
commit third and fourth degree offenses, the Criminal
Code additionally requires that the State prove that
defendant or a person with whom he conspired
committed an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy.
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2d; State v. LeFurge, 101 N.J. 404, 412-13
(1986); State v. Newell, 152 N.J. Super. 460, 466 (App.
Div. 1977). The wording of the conspiracy statute
requires only one overt act need be proven. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-
2d; cf. United States v. Blackwell, 954 F.Supp. 944, 958
(D.N.J. 1997) (under federal law the government is
under no obligation to prove every overt act alleged in the
indictment).
V. FORESEEABILITY
There is no requirement of subjective foreseeability of
criminal consequences as a basis for vicarious
coconspirator liability based on an objective standard of
reasonable foreseeability. The objective foreseeability
requirement for imposition of vicarious liability on a
coconspirator does not eliminate all requirements of
culpability; the objective foreseeability rule attempts to
limit the scope of such foreseeability to consequences that
were closely connected with the original conspiracy. A
coconspirator may be liable for the commission of
substantive criminal acts that are not within the scope of
a conspiracy if they are reasonably foreseeable as the
necessary or natural consequences of the conspiracy. State
v. Bridges, 133 N.J. 447 (1993).A conspirator can be held liable for the acts of others
that constitute a reasonably foreseeable risk arising out of
criminal conduct undertaken to effectuate conspiracy,
and occurring as the necessary or natural consequences of
conspiracy; the substantive crime must be reasonably and
closely connected to conspiracy, even though those
crimes may not have been within the actual
contemplation of conspirators or within the scope of the
conspiracy as originally planned. Thus, in Bridges, supra,
the evidence would fairly permit a jury to determine
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty
of the substantive crime of murder based on his
participation in the conspiracy to commit aggravated
assault, possess firearms for an unlawful purpose and
possess firearms without a permit. Although the
conspiracy did not have murder as an objective
conspiratorial plan, under the circumstances presented it
could be anticipated that a weapon might be fired at the
crowd and that hostilities might escalate in course of
carrying out the conspiracy.VI. RENUNCIATION OF PURPOSE ....................................................................................................
Renunciation of the conspiracy is an affirmative
defense which defendant must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence. To establish renunciation, defendant
must prove that after entering a conspiracy, he informed
the authorities of the conspiracy and his participation,
thwarted or caused to be thwarted the commission of any
offense in furtherance of the conspiracy, and the
circumstance manifest complete and voluntary renuncia-
tion of defendant’s criminal purpose.Defense of renunciation, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-
2e, presupposes an acknowledgment by the actor that he
actually conspired to commit a crime. State v. Hughes,
215 N.J. Super. 295, 298 (App. Div. 1986).
Renunciation posits prior participation and a defendant
cannot renounce a conspiracy he had not joined. Id.Once the prosecution demonstrates the defendant’s
involvement in a conspiracy, the defendant’s continued
involvement is presumed until the defendant proves
termination or withdrawal. A defendant withdraws from
a conspiracy only when he or she acts inconsistent with
the object of the conspiracy and communicates his or her
withdrawal in a manner reasonably calculated to reach his
or her co-conspirators. State v. Taccetta, 301 N.J. Super.