III. COERCIVE CONTEMPT
A. Definition
The coercive power of contempt does not seek to
punish, but rather seeks to compel compliance with an
injunction, judgment or order of the court or
administrative body. The contemnor in a coercive
contempt case can purge himself or herself of the
contempt by complying with the terms of the injunction,
judgment or order.
B. Rules Governing Coercive Contempt
Notwithstanding that an act or omission may also
constitute contempt of court, a litigant in an action may
seek relief by an application in the action. A judge shall
not be disqualified because he or she had signed the order
sought to be enforced. An order for confinement must be
terminable upon a party’s compliance with the order
disobeyed.
C. Procedures for Dealing with Coercive Contempt
An application by a litigant may be tried with a
proceeding under R. 1:10-2(a) only with the consent of
all parties and subject to the provisions of R. 1:10-2(c).
R. 1:10-3.
D. Rationale for Coercive Power of Contempt
The purpose of coercive power of contempt is to
afford supplemental relief to a litigant to enforce a court’s
order. Unlike a contempt proceeding under R. 1:10-1
and R. 1:10-2, punishment is not the objective, though
a sanction imposed by the court to compel compliance
may inflict punishment’s sting. East
Brunswick Bd. of Educ. v. East Brunswick Educ. Ass’n, 235
N.J. Super. 417, 422 (App. Div. 1989).
E. Examples of Coercive Power of Contempt
There is a line of civil contempt cases in which
persons have been incarcerated for refusal to testify before
grand juries and other investigative bodies. See, e.g.,
Catena v. Seidl, 68 N.J. 224 (1975); In re Zicarelli, 55
N.J. 249 (1970), aff’d 406 U.S. 472, 92 S.Ct. 1670, 32
L.Ed.2d 234 (1972); In the Matter of State Grand Jury
Investigation re Acceturo, 242 N.J. Super. 281 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 127 N.J. 324 (1990); In re Manna, 124
N.J. Super. 428 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 64 N.J. 158
(1973); see also Anyanwu v. Anyanwu, 333 N.J. Super.
345 (App. Div. 2000); Marshall v. Matthei, 327 N.J.
Super. 512 (App. Div. 2000).F. Maximum Penalties
Relief under R. 1:10-3, whether it be the imposition
of incarceration or a sanction, is not for the purpose of
punishment, but rather is a coercive measure to facilitate
the enforcement of a court order. Ridley v. Dennison, 298
N.J. Super. 373, 381 (App. Div. 1997).The court in structuring the sanction must consider
the offending party’s ability to pay and the sanction’s
impact on that party in light of income, status and
objectives, as well as the sanction’s impact on innocent
third parties. Franklin Tp. Bd. of Educ. v. Quakertown
Educ. Ass’n, 274 N.J. Super. 47, 56 (App. Div. 1994)
(citing East Brunswick Bd. of Educ. v. East Brunswick Educ.
Ass’n, 235 N.J. Super. at 422-23). Since incarceration
under this rule is intended to compel rather than punish,
a party must be released when the coercive purpose has
failed; continued incarceration would only serve a
punitive purpose. Marshall v. Matthei, 327 N.J. Super. at
527.