does not require the Legislature to punish or regulate all
persons in exactly the same way.
The court similarly rejected defendant’s contention
that their Equal Protection rights were violated because
the law was alleged to have a greater impact upon inner-
city drug traffickers, most of whom are members of racial
minorities. The statute is neutral on its face, served a
legitimate governmental end, and was not shown to have
been motivated by a discriminatory purpose. In so
holding, the court was guided by two federal cases
addressing similar issues that had arisen under the federal
“schoolyard statute.” United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d
1215 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 2199
(1987); United States v. Agilar, 779 F.2d 123 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1385 (1986).
Likewise in State v. Brown, supra, the court rejected
an equal protection challenge predicated upon the
contention that the statute “punish[es] more severely
conduct on one side of the street than it does similar
conduct on the other side of the street by randomly
drawing a theoretical line at an arbitrary distance from
school property.” State v. Brown, 227 N.J. Super, at 436.
The court found a rational relationship between the
hazards of drug activity occurring within 1,000 feet of
school property and the goal of protecting school
children from the direct and indirect hazards of narcotics
trafficking. Id. at 436-37.
D. 2C:35-9........................................................................................................................................
In State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536 (1994), the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of N.J.S.A.
2C:35-9, which imposes strict liability for drug-induced
deaths. The Court rejected defendants’ arguments that
the statute was vague, violated due process and
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Court
also found that codefendant Rodriguez’s conviction for
distribution in a school zone under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 did
not merge with the conviction for drug-induced death,
but that his conviction for manufacturing, distributing
and dispensing under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 did merge with
the drug induced death provision.
In an earlier decision, State v. Ervin, 242 N.J. Super.
584 (App. Div. 1990), the Appellate Division upheld
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9 against challenges of due process and
cruel and unusual punishment, based on a finding that
the statute limited such strict liability to deaths which
were proximate consequences of inherently dangerous
illegal activities.
E. 2C:35-10......................................................................................................................................
In State v. Patton, 133 N.J. 389 (1993), the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
10c, which requires persons in possession of controlled
dangerous substances to surrender the substances to the
police. The Court construed the statute to grant use and
derivative-use immunity upon one complying with its
provisions, and found that so construed, it did not violate
the privilege against self incrimination.In an interlocutory appeal, the Appellate Division in
State v. Gredder, 319 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 1999),
affirmed the trial court’s determination that defendant
was not entitled to immunity pursuant to statute and
caselaw when he answered police questions and admitted
possessing drugs when confronted. Suspecting that
defendant was transporting drugs to Newark from
Florida on a train, officers approached him after he exited
the train. He agreed to speak with them, and when they
asked if they could look in his luggage defendant further
agreed, admitting that he had marijuana. The police
during their search found a small amount of marijuana
and two bricks of cocaine, and a grand jury indicted
defendant for possessing the latter.Although N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10c provides that one who
illegally possesses drugs and does not voluntarily deliver
them to the police is a disorderly person, the court held
that this subsection provides transactional immunity for
section 10 offenses to persons complying with its
provisions and use and derivative-use immunity as to
other offenses because a “voluntary” delivery originates
with the possessor, and the court found that capitulation
to police requests did not constitute such a delivery under
the statute. The court concluded that defendant
voluntarily consented to a search after the police
confronted him during their investigation; he did not
“voluntarily deliver” any drug. Even if he had voluntarily
delivered the marijuana, he never did so as to the cocaine,
and also was never prosecuted for marijuana possession.F. 2C:35-7, 12, 14 and 15State v. Todd, 238 N.J. Super. 445 (App. Div. 1990);
State v. Blow, 237 N.J. Super. 184 (App. Div. 1989), rev’d
o.g., 123 N.J. 472 (1991); State v. Ogar, 229 N.J. Super.
459 (App. Div. 1989); State in the Interest of L.M., 229
N.J. Super. 88 (App. Div. 1988); State v. Brown, 227 N.J.
Super. 429 (Law Div. 1988).N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7,-12,-14,-15 were upheld against
constitutional challenges concerning separation of