positive for cocaine, then the clear inference is that the
other 165 vials, if tested, would also be found to contain
cocaine. The court also found no error resulted from the
trial court’s failure to charge the affirmative defenses in
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, that the offense occurred entirely in a
private residence, that no one seventeen years or younger
was present, and that the prohibited conduct did not
involve an intent to distribute.
State in the Interest of J.H., 244 N.J. Super. 207 (App.
Div. 1990) held that admission of a certified laboratory
report to prove the composition of the substance found in
a juvenile’s possession was drugs without requiring the
State to make a preliminary showing of reliability violated
the juvenile’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. To
establish an adequate foundation for such admission, the
State must satisfy tests of reliability set forth in State v.
Matulewicz, 101 N.J. 27 (1985), and present evidence
regarding differences between field and laboratory tests
performed on the substance in order to explain the
disparate results produced by those tests.
State v. Land, 136 N.J. Super. 354 (App. Div. 1975),
rev’d o.g., 73 N.J. 24 (1977), the court concluded that
the stalks and seeds of marijuana are adulterants and may
be included in the weight of marijuana charged.
4. Manufacture..................................................................................................................................
In State v. Miles, 231 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div.
1989), the Appellate Division found the definition of
“maintaining or operating a controlled dangerous
substance production facility” under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4,
was clear and thus found no need to go beyond the four
corners of the statute to determine the legislative intent.
Based on the statute’s “plain meaning,” the court
concluded that diluting a bulk quantity of drugs and
repackaging them into smaller units constituted the
“manufacture” of the substances within the meaning of
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4.
- Distribution
In the aptly-named State v. Roach, 222 N.J. Super.
122 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 317
(1988), the court held that a conviction for distribution
of CDS may be predicated upon evidence that defendant
had shared a marijuana cigarette with another, even
where defendant did not supply the marijuana. In so
holding, the court relied on State v. Sainz, 210 N.J. Super.
17 (App. Div. 1986), aff’d, 107 N.J. 283 (1987), in
which the court observed that “distribution under the
Act is present ‘whether the intent is merely to share
cocaine casually with a friend or to control a widespread
network of illicit distribution and sale.’”6. Employing a Juvenile
In State v. S.C., 289 N.J. Super. 61 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 145 N.J. 373 (1996), the Appellate Division
rejected defendant’s claim that there was not an adequate
factual basis to sustain his guilty plea to employing a
juvenile in a drug distribution scheme, contrary to
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6. Defendant admitted placing a three-
year-old child in his car on a trip from Delaware to New
York City to buy heroin for the purpose of reducing the
likelihood of police detection. The court rejected
defendant’s attempt to attribute a narrow meaning to the
word “use” and relied on both the plain meaning of that
word and the legislative commentary to conclude that
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 is violated by an adult who “uses
children in any way to facilitate the distribution of
drugs.” Thus, active participation by the minor is
irrelevant so long as the adult acts with the requisite
purpose. The court also found the child’s young age to
be irrelevant to defendant’s culpability, and further
found the evidence of a distribution scheme sufficient
since defendant’s purpose was to share the heroin with his
fiancee in Delaware.State v. Collins, 262 N.J. Super. 230 (App. Div.
1993) - where one of the elements of the offense of
employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme under
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 is that defendant was at least 18 years
of age at the time he/she engaged in the conduct alleged,
and where the State failed to offer any proof of defendant’s
age, defendant’s conviction thereon must be vacated.B. Expert Testimony
The leading cases on this issue are State v. Odom, 116
N.J. 65 (1989), and State v. Berry, 140 N.J. 280 (1995).
In State v. Odom, 116 N.J. 65 (1989), the Supreme Court
held not only was it proper for an expert to testify about
the quality and quantity of drugs, their packaging, street
value, and characteristics, but the expert may also render
testimony concerning the subject of intent or purpose in
connection with the possession of unlawful drugs because
such subject is beyond the understanding of average
persons. The Court also found that as long as the expert
does not express his opinion of defendant’s guilt but
simply characterizes defendant’s conduct based on the
facts in evidence in light of his specialized knowledge, the
opinion is not objectionable even though it embraces the
ultimate issues the jury must decide.