prejudicial publicity, the court should change the venue
of the trial. State v. Harris, 156 N.J. at 147.
As to a motion for change of venue where the
indictment is returned by a State Grand Jury, See State v.
Mullen, supra. (motion is heard by the assignment judge
designated under the State Grand Jury Act and not by the
judge assigned to preside over the trial or by the
assignment judge of the assigned county).
C. Trial Calendar (See also, JOINDER and
SEVERANCE and SIXTH AMENDMENT, this
Digest)
The trial judge exercises discretion over pretrial
decisions including requests for continuances. State v.
Bowens, 108 N.J. 622, 637 (1987); State v. Mance, 300
N.J. Super. 37, 53 (App. Div. 1997) (no abuse of
discretion in case involving attack on prison guards in
denial of continuance because of ongoing prison hostage
situations in another state); State v. Jackson, 289 N.J.
Super. 43, 49 (App. Div. 1996), certif. denied, 148 N.J.
462 (1997) (no abuse in denial of continuance where
defendant claimed fatal shooting of police officer in
courthouse 5 days before defendant’s trial was
prejudicial); State v. Rodriguez, 264 N.J. Super. 261, 274
(App. Div. 1993), aff’d 135 N.J. 3 (1994) (no abuse in
denying continuance because of illness of victim); State v.
Kyles, 132 N.J. Super. 397, 402 (App. Div. 1975) (no
abuse of discretion in refusing continuance for
nonappearance of defense witnesses, who were relatives of
defendant, where defense counsel did not request
issuance of bench warrant to compel their appearance);
State v. Smith, 66 N.J. Super, 465, 468 (App. Div. 1961),
aff’d 36 N.J. 307 (1962) (continuance should normally
be granted to procure alibi witness); State v. Gallicchio, 51
N.J. 313, 318 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 912 (1968)
(no error in failing to grant continuance based upon
alleged prejudicial publicity, when trial date was eight
months after the crime and six months after newspaper
article appeared). Cf. State v. Jasuilewicz, 205 N.J. Super.
558 (App. Div. 1985) (failure to adjourn trial of
defendant, who proceeded with insanity defense, after
substantial pre-verdict publicity concerning Hinckley
trial was reversible error), See State v. Audette, 201 N.J.
Super. 410, 414-415 (App. Div. 1985) (rather than
granting defendant’s motion to suppress, trial court
should have granted State’s motion for adjournment of
suppression hearing).
When a defendant applies for an adjournment to
enable him to substitute counsel, the granting of a
continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and the exercise of that discretion will not
constitute reversible error in the absence of a showing of
an abuse of discretion causing defendant a manifest
wrong or injury. State v. McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super.
242, 258-59 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 156 N.J.
381 (1998); State v. Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. 395, 402
(App. Div. 1985), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 266 (1985);
State v. Lamb, 125 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div.
1973); State v. Smith, 87 N.J. Super. 98. 105 (App. Div.
1965). “[T]he trial court must strike a balance between
its inherent and necessary right to control its own
calendar and the public’s interest in the orderly
administration of justice, on the one hand, and the
defendant’s constitutional right to obtain counsel of his
own choice, on the other.” State v. Furguson, supra (no
abuse of discretion in failure of trial court to grant
defendant’s request for adjournment where defendant’s
request would have further delayed the trial, where need
for adjournment arose from private attorney’s and
defendant’s neglect in giving notice of attempted
substitution of counsel and where defendant had
competent, experienced counsel available and prepared
to try case and no complaint was raised that attorney’s
representation was inadequate). See also Morris v. Slappy,
461 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1616 (1983) (no abuse of
discretion when trial court denied motion for
continuance which was based on ground that substitute
counsel had inadequate preparation time where counsel
said he was ready for trial and his performance was
adequate).The granting of a continuance for health reasons is
also a matter for the discretion of the trial judge. State v.
Kaiser, 74 N.J. Super. 257, 271 (App. Div. 1962), certif.
denied, 38 N.J. 310 (1962). In the exercise of discretion,
the trial judge should consider the following factors: (1)
medical reports, (2) personal observations of the accused,
(3) the effect of a continuance upon the State’s ability to
present evidence and (4) whether or not the accused will
be better able to stand trial at a later date. Id.The court rules also provide that an adjournment
may be granted where either defendant or State fail to
provide alibi information, R. 3:12-2(b); where defendant
fails to give written notice of specific criminal code
defenses, R. 3:12-1; and either defendant or the State fails
to make timely discovery, R. 3:13-3(g). See State v. Utsch,
184 N.J. Super. 575 (App. Div. 1982) (approving
adjournment where the prosecution failed to make
timely discovery).Courts have the inherent power to control cases on its
own calendar, See State v. Slobisk, 100 N.J. Super. 590,