1999). Ordinarily, the better practice is to “mold the
instruction in a manner that explains the law to the jury
in the context of the material facts of the case.” State v.
Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988); State v. Damiano,
322 N.J. Super. 22, 36 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied,
163 N.J. 396 (2000). “That requirement has been
imposed in various contexts in which the statement of
relevant law, when divorced from the facts, was
potentially confusing or misleading to the jury.” State v.
Robinson, 165 N.J. at 42. However, that requirement
does not include summarizing the strengths and
weaknesses of the evidence, a task more appropriately left
for counsel. Id. at 45. Moreover, a trial court’s failure to
relate its explanation of the law to the specific facts of the
case is not reversible error if the reviewing court concludes
that the model jury instruction adequately explained the
law, particularly in the absence of objection. State v.
Walker, 322 N.J. Super. 535, 548 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 162 N.J. 487 (1999).
Trial courts should endeavor clearly and correctly to
convey their instructions to the jury concerning the law
to be applied to the case. However, in considering the
propriety of a set of instructions, it does not suffice to
examine a small portion thereof standing in isolation.
Rather, the charge in its entirety must be reviewed so as
to determine its overall effect. State v. Jordan, 147 N.J.
409, 422 (1997); State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. at 420 (1973).
Our courts consider as well the lawyers’ argument, State
v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 145 (1991), the evidence which
was adduced at trial, State v. Thomas, 103 N.J. Super.
154, 158 (App. Div. 1968), the lack of objection below,
State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. at 422, and any other relevant
information gleaned from the record of the trial as a
whole.
The jury should not be instructed on an offense
which is not sustained by the proofs. For example, where
the proofs do not indicate a first degree murder issue,
then that issue should not be contained in the charge.
However, giving a charge which is correct on the law, but
is inapplicable to the facts or issues before the jury, i.e.,
overcharging, does not require reversal absent prejudice
to the defendant. State v. Thomas, 76 N.J. 344 (1978),
clarifying and modifying the court’s earlier holding in
State v. Christener, 71 N.J. 55, 69 (1976); State v. Moore,
330 N.J. Super. 535, 541 (App. Div. 2000); State v.
Brown, 325 N.J. Super. 447, 454 (App. Div. 1999),
certif. denied, 163 N.J. 76 (2000).
A trial court may not direct a verdict of guilty against
a defendant in a criminal case. State v. Collier, 90 N.J.
117, 122 (1982) (in rape prosecution where trial court
directed a verdict of guilty on charge of contributing to
delinquency of minor, error was not harmless as it
contributed to guilty verdict on rape charge). See State v.
Ragland, 105 N.J. 189 (1986) (in conducting successive
trials before same jury on charges of unlawful possession
of weapon and possession of a weapon by convicted felon,
jury must be instructed to consider evidence previously
admitted but to disregard its previous verdict). See State
v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194 (1990) (ruling that sequential
charge of successive crime improper because it can
prevent jury from fully considering each charge); cf. State
v. Mack, 131 N.J. Super. 542, 545-546 (App. Div. 1974)
(there is no objection to a court removing from the jury’s
consideration an uncontroverted fact, even when that fact
constitutes an element of the crime charged).Special interrogatories to the jury are not looked
upon with favor because of their potential to dilute the
jury’s exclusive responsibility to deliberate upon the issue
of guilt or innocence free of extraneous influences. State
v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 199 (1979); see also State v. M.L.,
253 N.J. Super. 13, 26-27 (App. Div. 1991), certif.
denied, 127 N.J. 560 (1992) (special interrogatories are
disfavored, yet not prohibited); State v. McAllister, 211
N.J. Super. 355, 363 (App. Div. 1986).3. Lesser-Included Offenses
A court may charge the jury on a lesser-included
offense when the facts provide “a rational basis for a
verdict convicting the defendant of the included offense”
instead of the offense charged in the indictment. N.J.S.A.
2C:1-8e; see also State v. Pantusco, 330 N.J. Super. 424,
445 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 527
(2000). In order to charge a lesser-included offense,
there must be a basis for finding the defendant not guilty
of the greater offense, as well as guilty of the lesser offense.
State v. Brent, 137 N.J. 107, 115-17 (1994); State v.
Braxton, 330 N.J. Super. 561, 565 (App. Div. 2000). A
court should not submit a lesser-included offense which
invites the jury to engage in speculation. State v. Mendez,
252 N.J. Super. 155, 159 (App. Div. 1991), certif. denied,
127 N.J. 560 (1992).If the defendant does not request a charge on a lesser-
included offense, “[t]he trial court does not... have the
obligation on its own meticulously to sift through the
entire record... to see if some combination of facts and
inferences might rationally sustain [the] charge” on the
lesser offense. State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 299 (1985).
“It is only when the facts ‘clearly indicate’ the
appropriateness of that charge that the duty of the trial
court arises.” Id.; State v. Brent, 137 N.J. at 115-18.