The presumption of non-imprisonment under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1e applies to these offenses. The statute
requires that sentencing for disorderly persons and petty
disorderly persons be determinate. As a general rule, bail
for these offenses is not to exceed $2,500. N.J.S.A. 2C:6-
State v. Pescatore, 213 N.J. Super. 22 (App. Div.
1986), aff’d 105 N.J. 441 (1987), held that the
disorderly persons penalty prescribed by New Jersey
Sales Tax Act is not the exclusive penalty for violations,
and the State can seek harsher criminal sanctions under
any applicable criminal statutes. In relation to said
violations, disclosure of tax returns is proper.
V. SPECIFIC DISORDERLY AND PETTY
DISORDERLY PERSONS STATUTES AND
CASES
A. Failure To Disperse (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-1b)
B. Disorderly Conduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2)
1. Improper behavior (fighting) (N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a)
In State v. Oliver, 320 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 161 N.J. 332 (1999), the Appellate
Division affirmed defendants’ disorderly persons
convictions for creating a hazardous or physically
dangerous condition by an act serving no legitimate
purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a(2), and their prohibited
municipal ordinance violations on beach bathing.
Defendants had been surfing in a beach area closed to the
public due to a tropical storm, and had refused police
officers’ entreaties to exit the water. The municipal court
had both territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction over
this case, and the Public Trust Doctrine did not require
adjudication in the Superior Court because that doctrine
did not limit territorial jurisdiction. Also, the enabling
statutes defining waters bounding the municipality,
beaches bordering it, and “bathing facilities” were not
vague and satisfied due process. Finally, the court
determined that the evidence clearly supported
defendants’ convictions, and the municipal court judge
did not err in refusing one defendant’s request to
substitute counsel.
In State v. Egles, 308 N.J. Super. 124 (App. Div.
1998), the Appellate Division reversed the Law
Division’s dismissal of a complaint charging disorderly
conduct under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a, and resisting arrest.
An arrest warrant may issue based upon a disorderly
conduct complaint, but here the warrant itself was not
issued until after the police had arrested defendant. Still,
the Appellate Division found that the Law Division judge
should have granted the State’s request to amend the
complaint-warrant (R. 3:2-3) and treat it as a complaint-
summons (R. 3:2-2) pursuant to Rule 3:3-4, since the
complaint remains the same and simply the means of
process changes. It determined in this case that
dismissing the complaint was drastic action when merely
a defect of process occurred, which an amendment of the
complaint-warrant to a complaint-summons would have
cured. Finally, the court noted that the appropriate
remedy for an improper arrest is suppression of any
evidence seized in connection with that arrest, not
dismissal of the entire complaint.State v. Figueroa, 237 N.J. Super. 215 (App. Div.
1989), certif. denied, 121 N.J. 643 (1990), held that it
was proper for the trial judge to refuse to charge improper
behavior under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a(2) as a lesser included
offense of aggravated arson, because there was no rational
basis in the evidence to charge any offense having a lesser
culpability than purposeful or knowing.In State v. Cummins, 168 N.J. Super. 429 (Law Div.
1979), a mental patient at a psychiatric hospital was
charged with disorderly conduct under N.J.S.A. 2A:170-
28 (since repealed and replaced by N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2 and
33-8) for disruptive conduct induced by his illness.
Hospital records revealed that the patient was manic
depressive and that in limited circumstances, his
character and judgment were questionable. An
institutional attendant brought charges, and defendant
was convicted in municipal court. In reversing
defendant’s conviction, the Law Division judge found
that applying the disorderly persons offense statute to
this defendant was not only a misapplication of the
statute but constituted an unconstitutional infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.In State v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1 (1979), defendant, a
press photographer for the Star Ledger, claimed privilege
as a newspaperman for refusal to heed a police officer’s
order to remove himself from the immediate vicinity of an
automobile accident. Whether a newsperson’s conduct
is disorderly must turn on whether, from an objective
standpoint and under all of the circumstances, the
policeman’s order to the newsman was reasonable, taking
into account the special role performed by the press.
Defendant’s disorderly persons conviction under
N.J.S.A. 2A:170-29 (since repealed and replaced by
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a(2) and 2C:33-4) was affirmed due to
the exigent circumstances surrounding the accident,