intent of the Domestic Violence Act to protect women
who are assaulted while pregnant).
D. Sufficiency of the Act Allegedly Constituting Domestic Violence
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a prohibits the entry of a
restraining order without a finding or an admission by
the defendant that an act of domestic violence was
committed. Kanaszka v. Kunen, 313 N.J. Super. 600,
607 (App. Div. 1998). The acts claimed by a plaintiff to
be domestic violence must be evaluated in light of the
previous history of violence between the parties including
previous threats, harassment and physical abuse, and in
light of whether immediate danger to person or property
is present. Peranio v. Peranio, 280 N.J. Super. 47, 54
(App. Div. 1995). This requirement reflects the reality
that ordinarily domestic violence is more than an isolated
aberrant act and it incorporates the legislative intent to
provide a vehicle to protect victims whose safety is
threatened. Id.; accord, D.C. v. F.R. 286 N.J. Super. 589,
608-09 (App. Div. 1996); Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J.
Super. 243, 249-50 (App. Div. 1995).
However, in Cesare, the Supreme Court recognized
that one sufficiently egregious act may constitute
domestic violence under the Act, even with no history of
abuse between the parties or that an ambiguous act may
qualify as domestic violence based upon a finding of
violence in the parties’ past. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. at
- Accord Kamen v. Egan, 322 N.J. Super. 222, 228
(App. Div. 1999).
The analysis of the sufficiency of the alleged act of
domestic violence is fact-sensitive. In assessing an
allegation of domestic violence, the courts can consider
evidence of a defendant’s prior abusive acts, regardless of
whether those acts have been the subject of a domestic
violence adjudication. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
405 (1998). After weighing the entire relationship
between the parties the court must specifically set forth
its factual findings. Id.
1. Trespass
Kamen v. Egan, 322 N.J. Super. 222, 228-29 (App.
Div. 1999) (daughter’s single act of trespass of entering
her father’s house without his permission to visit her
children, who lived there, on a day that was not
designated as a visitation day, was insufficient to justify
the issuance of a restraining order because the trespass did
not involve violence or a threat of violence and there was
no history of violence between the parties).2. Harassment
Integral to finding harassment pursuant to the
Domestic Violence Act is a showing of a purpose to
harass, along with a course of alarming conduct. State v.
Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 576 (1997); Sweeney v.
Honachefsky, 313 N.J. Super. 443, 447 (App. Div. 1998);
Peranio v. Peranio, 280 N.J. Super. 47, 55 (App. Div.
1995); D.C. v. T.H., 269 N.J. Super. 458, 461-62 (App.
Div. 1994); E.K. v. G.K., 241 N.J. Super. 567, 570 (App.
Div. 1990); Grant v. Wright, 222 N.J. Super. 191, 196
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 562 (1988). See also
L.D. v. W.D., Jr., 327 N.J. Super. 1, 4-5 (App. Div. 1999)
(husband’s taking parties’ children to counseling instead
of choir practice and calling wife at work to say he had
moved her desk from their shared office into their living
room, were not harassment within meaning of the
Domestic Violence Act); J.F. v. B.K., 308 N.J. Super.
387, 391 (App. Div. 1998) (absent evidence of
surrounding circumstances to raise defendant’s innocu-
ous conduct of placing a note on the plaintiff’s car to talk
to her to harassment, there was no basis for a restraining
order under the Domestic Violence Act); J.N.S. v. D.B.S.,
302 N.J. Super. 525, 530-31 (App. Div. 1997)
(husband’s alleged conduct, during separation from his
wife, of blocking wife’s driveway for several minutes with
his car when picking up children for visit, giving wife a
vulgar hand gesture when picking up their son for a visit,
calling wife obscene names, making offensive remarks of
ethnic and sexual nature about wife’s new boyfriend in
child’s presence and kicking wife’s garbage can over when
returning son home after visit did not constitute
“harassment” or “domestic violence” warranting issuance
of restraining order under the Domestic Violence Act);
Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 249-50 (App.
Div. 1995) (husband’s calling his wife at work after they
had separated and threatening drastic measures if she did
not provide money to pay bills, and then terminating her
phone service when she did not pay were not harassment
pursuant to the Domestic Violence Act, where there was
no history of domestic violence between them, and wife
was neither harmed nor subjected to potential injury);
D.C. v. T.H., 269 N.J. Super. 458, 461-62 (App. Div.
1994) (father’s statement to mother expressing concern
over her boyfriend’s allegedly inappropriate discipline of
child was not “harassment” within the Domestic
Violence Act absent evidence that the statement was
made for purpose of harassing the mother or to alarm or
seriously annoy her); Mann v. Mann, 270 N.J. Super.
269, 271 (App. Div. 1993) (evidence that wife pulled