l. Prohibition from Possessing Firearms.An order prohibiting the defendant from possessing
any firearm or other weapon enumerated in N.J.S.A.
2C:39-1r and ordering the search for and seizure of any
such weapon at any location where the judge has
reasonable cause to believe the weapon is located. The
judge shall state with specificity the reasons for and scope
of the search and seizure authorized by the order.
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29b(16)
The court may not, however, issue an in-house
restraining order. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-28.1.
D. Dissolution or Modification of Final Restraining Order
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29d, upon good cause
shown, any final order may be dissolved or modified upon
application to the Family Part of the Superior Court,
Chancery Division, but only if the judge who dissolves or
modifies the order is the same judge who entered the
order, or has available a complete record of the hearing or
hearings on which the order was based.
1. Standard
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29d, the court may
dissolve or modify a restraining order upon “good cause
shown.” This includes “a change in circumstances
[whereby] the continued enforcement of the injunctive
process would be inequitable, oppressive, or unjust, or in
contravention of the policy of the law.” Carfagno v.
Carfagno, 288 N.J. Super. 424, 434 (Ch. Div. 1995)
(alterations in original). See Sweeney v. Honachefsky, 313
N.J. Super. 443, 445-46 (App. Div. 1998); Kanaszka v.
Kunen, 313 N.J. Super. 600, 608 (App. Div. 1998).
Dissolution of a restraining order at the request of the
victim is not mandatory. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 314 N.J.
Super. 350, 353 (Ch. Div. 1998). Rather, dissolution is
within the sound discretion of the court and should
depend upon a showing of good cause with an
independent finding by the court based upon the history
of the parties and other facts of the case. Id. at 362;
Kanaszka v. Kunen, 313 N.J. Super. at 607. See also I.J.
v. I.S., 328 N.J. Super. 166, 177-79 (Ch. Div. 1999)
(good cause requirement to dismiss a restraining order
pertains to abuser not the victim).
2. Dissolution Hearing
Not every motion for dissolution of a restraining
order entered pursuant to the Domestic Violence Act
requires a plenary hearing. Kanaszka v. Kunen, 313 N.J.
Super. 600, 608 (App. Div. 1998). However, if the court
presiding over a party’s motion to dissolve a final
restraining order, did not enter the order, the “complete
record” requirement of the Domestic Violence Act
includes, at a minimum, all pleadings and orders and the
court file. Id. at 606-07. In most cases, the transcript
should accompany party’s motion to vacate the order to
allow the court to fully understand all of the
circumstances and dynamics involved in the relationship
and the dissolution application. Id. at 607. There is no
requirement, however, that one year must expire from
date of entry of the domestic violence restraining order
before the defendant may move to dissolve the order. Id.
at 609. (disapproving of the suggestion for a one year
period to be engrafted into N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29d stated in
M.J. v. J.R.G., 312 N.J. Super. 597, 602-03 (Ch. Div.
1997)).3. Carfagno Factors:
Factors the court should consider when determining
whether good cause has been shown to dissolve a
restraining order upon a request by the defendant,
include: (1) the victim’s consent to vacating the
restraining order; (2) the victim’s fears of future violence;
(3) present relationship between the parties; (4)
defendant’s contempt convictions for violating restrain-
ing orders; (5) defendant’s continuing involvement with
drug or alcohol abuse; (6) defendant’s involvement in
other violent acts with other persons; (7) defendant’s
involvement in counseling; (8) defendant’s age and
health; (9) whether the victim is acting in good faith
when opposing the defendant’s request for dissolution;
(10) restraining orders between parties in other
jurisdictions; and (11) other factors deemed relevant by
the court. Carfagno v. Carfagno, 288 N.J. Super. 424,
435-442 (Ch. Div. 1995).4. Fears of Future Violence
The Domestic Violence Act is designed to protect
victims from physical harm as well as mental and
emotional harm, because one party frequently asserts
power and control over the other. Carfagno, 288 N.J.
Super. at 436. The test is one of objective fear, not
subjective fear. Id. at 437. Objective fear is that which
a reasonable victim similarly situated would have under
the circumstances. Id.; Stevenson v. Stevenson, 314 N.J.
Super. at 363-64. The exploration of the victim’s
continued fear of the perpetrator may include incidents
that were not testified to at the final restraining order
hearing, particularly when the allegations are in the