complaint or the matter is uncontested. Kanaszka v.
Kunen, 313 N.J. Super. at 607-08.
5. Reconciliation
Even in cases of reconciliation, under the “good
cause” standard, the court must make an independent
finding based upon objective evidence that continued
protection is unnecessary before vacating a restraining
order. A.B. v. L.M., 289 N.J. Super. 125, 128-31 (App.
Div. 1996); Stevenson v. Stevenson, 314 N.J. Super. 350,
364 (Ch. Div. 1998); Torres v. Lancellotti, 257 N.J.
Super. 126, 129-31 (Ch. Div. 1992). In prior cases,
courts had found that reconciliation by parties that were
separated by a court order entered under the Domestic
Violence Act acted as a de facto vacation of the order.
Mohamed v. Mohamed, 232 N.J. Super. 474, 477 (App.
Div. 1989); Hayes v. Hayes, 251 N.J. Super. 160, 167
(Ch. Div. 1991). In A.B., the Appellate Division
distinguished Mohamed as being predicated upon the
Domestic Violence Act of 1981 which was substantially
revised in 1991. A.B. v. L.M., 289 N.J. Super. at 129-30.
In light of A.B., the prevailing law is that “[w]hen
confronted with a party’s request to vacate a domestic
violence order on the ground of reconciliation, the court
should closely scrutinize the record to determine whether
there is a likelihood that violent conduct will be
repeated.” Id. at 131. Thus, before vacating a restraining
order, the court should carefully consider the factors set
forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29a. Id. at 131; Carfagno, 288
N.J. Super. at 436. Nonetheless, there is no longer a need
for a restraining order when there is true reconciliation.
Torres v. Lancellotti, 257 N.J. Super. at 131; C.O. v. J.O.,
292 N.J. Super. 219, 224 (Ch. Div. 1996).
Note, however, that even when the parties mutually
reconcile, the restraining order is still in effect because
only the court can modify its terms or vacate it. Absent
any action by the court, the restraining order is still in
effect. State v. Washington, 319 N.J. Super. 681 (Law Div.
1998).
6. Reinstatement of a Restraining Order
The court’s authority to dissolve or modify a
restraining order must include the authority to vacate a
conditionally entered dismissal. C.O. v. J.O., 292 N.J.
Super. at 223. Thus, where the court dismissed the
restraining order without prejudice on the condition that
the defendant would attend counseling, R. 4:37-1(b)
required the dismissed restraining order to be vacated
when the defendant breached that condition and good
cause existed to reinstate the original restraining order.
Id.E. Contempt Proceedings upon a Violation of a domestic violence order
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-30 provides: except as provided
below, a violation by the defendant of an order issued
pursuant to the Domestic Violence Act shall constitute
an offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9b and each order shall
so state. All contempt proceedings conducted pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9 involving domestic violence orders,
other than those constituting indictable offenses, shall be
heard by the Family Part of the Superior Court, Chancery
Division. All contempt proceedings brought pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 et seq. shall be subject to any rules or
guidelines established by the Supreme Court to
guarantee the prompt disposition of criminal matters.
Additionally, and notwithstanding the term of
imprisonment provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-8, any person
convicted of a second or subsequent nonindictable
domestic violence contempt offense shall serve a
minimum term of not less than 30 days. Orders entered
pursuant to paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (8) and (9) of
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29b shall be excluded from enforcement
under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9b; however, violations of these
orders may be enforced in a civil or criminal action
initiated by the plaintiff or by the court, on its own
motion, pursuant to applicable court rules.Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-31, a law enforcement
officer must arrest a defendant when the officer finds that
there is probable cause that a defendant has committed
contempt of a domestic violence order.Where, however, a person alleges that a defendant has
committed contempt of a domestic violence order but the
law enforcement officer has found that there is not
probable cause sufficient to arrest the defendant, the law
enforcement officer shall advise the complainant of the
procedure for completing and signing a criminal
complaint alleging a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9.
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-32.In a criminal contempt proceeding it is irrelevant
whether a TRO in effect at the time of the violation is later
vacated or dismissed or if no permanent restraining order
is issued as long as the TRO was in existence at the time
of the alleged improper conduct. State v. Sanders, 327
N.J. Super. 385, 387 (App. Div. 2000). Moreover,
reconciliation of the parties after the issuance of a
domestic violence order did not vitiate the restraining
order. State v. Washington, 319 N.J. Super. 681, 686-90