(Law Div. 1998). In the absence of any application to the
court to dismiss the order or any action by the court, the
parties conduct of reconciliation does not serve as a
defense to a charge of contempt. Id. at 690. See also State
v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997) (defendant’s two
mailings containing torn-up copies of support order and
the notice of motion to modify were written contacts with
wife in violation of restraining order supporting the
contempt conviction); State v. Krupinski, 321 N.J. Super.
34 (App. Div. 1999) (finding defendant’s de minimus
conduct including a trivial, non-actionable event could
not form a basis for a conviction for contempt as
disorderly persons’s offense); Von Pein v. Von Pein, 268
N.J. Super. 7 (App. Div. 1993) (court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to institute criminal contempt
proceedings against former husband); State v. Wilmouth,
302 N.J. Super. 20 (App. Div. 1997) (father’s oral
statement to mother, as she picked up child, as to
whether he would get to see child on the next day was not
contempt of a domestic violence restraining order
prohibiting contact with mother, since mother did not
construe the order as affecting direct communication
between her and the father regarding visitation); State v.
J.T., 294 N.J. Super. 540 (App. Div. 1996) (evidence was
sufficient to establish that defendant engaged in course of
alarming conduct to support harassment and contempt
convictions); State v. L.C., 283 N.J. Super. 441, 450-51
(App. Div. 1995) (while wife inappropriately referred to
husband’s female friend as a “whore” and “slut” in
expressing dissatisfaction that friend had attended
parties’ son’s birthday party, that speech did not
constitute type of “harassment” contemplated by the
Domestic Violence Act or “harassing communications”
under final restraining order provision in contempt
proceeding), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 325 (1996).
1. Enhanced Penalty
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-30 any person convicted
of a “second or subsequent non-indictable domestic
violence contempt offense” must serve a period of
incarceration of at least thirty days. In State v. Bowser,
272 N.J. Super. 582 (Law Div. 1993), the Law Division
concluded that the enhanced penalty should not be
applied to an individual who has been simultaneously
convicted of multiple non-indictable domestic violence
contempts which occurred on separate occasions. The
court interpreted N.J.S.A. 2C:25-30 as “requiring the
entry of a prior conviction, at the time of the commission
of the offense in question, as a prerequisite to the
imposition of that enhanced penalty.” Id.
2. Conditions of a Parole after Release from Custody
Under the clear and prevailing rules of law, a
sentencing judge is without authority to establish
conditions of parole after a defendant’s release from
custody, even if those conditions are case or party related
and may be warranted by the nature of the circumstances
or the quality of the relationship between the victim and
the defendant. State v. Beauchamp, 262 N.J. Super. 532,
536 (App. Div. 1993). To do so would be an
unwarranted intrusion on the executive branch of
government and would unremittingly govern defendant’s
future freedom because of valid concerns at sentencing,
without allowing for changes in circumstance or attitude.
Id. at 538. The Beauchamp court noted that its
reservations about a sentencing court’s action did not
bear upon its authority or discretion to provide the Parole
Board with all of the factual concerns, judgments and
insights it developed as a result of its exposure to the
criminal case as long as the statements were limited to a
report of background information or as recommended
factors for the Parole Board’s consideration. Id. at 537.
Accord, State v. J.F., 262 N.J. Super. 539, 542-44 (App.
Div. 1993) (plea agreement provision adopted as part of
the judgment of conviction that “upon release
[defendant] may not reside in New Jersey” was invalid
where State conceded that it was condition of parole).III. ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Arrests and Filing Criminal Complaints
1. Mandatory Arrest
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-21a provides: “[w]hen a person
claims to be a victim of domestic violence, and where a law
enforcement officer responding to the incident finds
probable cause to believe that domestic violence has
occurred, the law enforcement officer shall arrest the
person who is alleged to be the person who subjected the
victim to domestic violence and shall sign a criminal
complaint if: (1) the victim exhibits signs of injury caused
by an act of domestic violence; (2) a warrant is in effect;
(3) probable cause exists that the perpetrator has violated
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9, and probable cause exists that the
person has been served with the order alleged to have been
violated; or (4) probable cause exists that a weapon as
defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1r, has been involved in the
commission of a domestic violence act.”