Halper led to numerous double-jeopardy-based
attacks on forfeiture, but in 1996, the United States
Supreme Court held in United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S.
267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), that the
remedy of civil in rem forfeiture, at least, does not
constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
Civil in rem forfeiture was thus revitalized after a period
of constitutional doubt.
In State v. $3,000, 292 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div.
1996), defendant pled guilty to drug charges arising
from an investigation that had also led to a forfeiture
action against $3,000 seized from defendant. Defendant
challenged the forfeiture on double jeopardy grounds.
The Appellate Division noted the “congruence” between
federal double jeopardy jurisprudence and New Jersey
double jeopardy jurisprudence. The court noted further
that New Jersey has accepted “federal jurisprudence in
respect of civil forfeiture classifications and conse-
quences.” Following Ursery, then, the Appellate Division
held that civil in rem forfeiture under New Jersey’s statute
does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.
In State v. Womack, 145 N.J. 576 (1996), defendant
was investigated for practicing medicine without a
license. Through settlement of a civil action, the
Attorney General obtained an injunction restricting
defendant’s practice of “medicine,” although he was
allowed to continue operation of his “Wellness Center.”
Defendant also agreed to pay $5,000 in “civil penalties“
and $3,554.07 in “investigative costs.” After the State
indicted defendant for third degree practicing medicine
without a license, defendant moved to dismiss the
indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The Supreme
Court ruled that multiple punishment protection may
be implicated by a civil penalty imposed for conduct that
also results in a criminal penalty. The Court ruled that
if the civil penalty were “punitive,” it would implicate
double jeopardy protection, but if the penalty were
“remedial,” it would not. Even so, the Court concluded,
a punitive civil penalty might be remitted or reduced to
bring it within constitutional, remedial tolerances.
In Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct.
488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), the United States
Supreme Court held that administratively imposed
monetary penalties and occupational debarment did not
preclude on double jeopardy grounds subsequent
criminal indictment for essentially the same federal
banking statute violations. The administrative
proceedings were civil, not criminal, and the Court’s
holding in large part disavowed the analysis used in
Halper,, and reaffirmed the rule previously established in
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65
L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). The Double Jeopardy Clause, the
Court held, protects only against imposing multiple
criminal punishment for the same offense, and whether
a particular punishment is criminal or civil initially
focuses on statutory construction; Halper marked the first
time the Court applied the double jeopardy clause to a
sanction without first determining if it was criminal in
nature. That decision deviated from traditional double
jeopardy doctrine by avoiding the threshold question of
whether the successive punishment was “criminal,” and
by assessing the character of the actual sanctions
imposed. This deviation was “ill considered” and
“unworkable.” Applying traditional double jeopardy
principles illustrated no multiple punishment in this
case because the monetary penalties and debarment
sanctions were civil in nature. Administrative agencies do
not generally impose criminal penalties, nor were the
sanctions here so punitive in form and effect that they
constituted criminal punishment.In State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438 (1998), the Court
held that criminal prosecutions for absconding from
parole, brought under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5b, are neither
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause nor by
principles of fundamental fairness in cases where the
Parole Board has also revoked parole for the same act of
absconding. The Court concluded that parole revocation
proceedings are not criminal in nature and do not
constitute “punishment” for double jeopardy purposes
because the aim of the entire parole system, including
parole revocation, is remedial and not punitive in nature,
as it seeks to protect the welfare of parolees and the safety
of society.State v. Parker, 335 N.J. Super. 415 (App. Div.
2000). In the context of a merger analysis, the Appellate
Division concluded that the interests protected by
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1, with sentencing provisions for
public-facility drug offenses and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, with
sentencing provisions for school-zone drug offenses are
the same interests. Therefore, the Court reasoned, to
impose separate punishment, that is, separate sentences,
for violation of those statutes would offend double
jeopardy principles.VI. COMPULSORY JOINDER
Although not required by principles of double
jeopardy, New Jersey has adopted a compulsory joinder
rule which generally requires a prosecutor to join for a
single trial all offenses arising from the same episode or