ELECTIONSELECTIONSELECTIONSELECTIONSELECTIONS
I. INTERFERENCE WITH THE EXERCISE OF
THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Under N.J.S.A. 2C:27-3a(1) and b (Threats and
Other Improper Influence in Official and Political
Matters), it is a third degree crime to directly or indirectly
“threaten[] unlawful harm to any person with purpose to
influence a decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or
exercise of discretion of a public servant, party official or
voter on any public issue or in any public election... .”
See also, N.J.S.A. 2C: 27-2 (Bribery in Official and
Political Matters).
II. ELECTION LAW VIOLATIONS
Violations of the elections laws have both criminal
and civil consequences, and prosecutors are responsible to
investigate the criminal aspects. The Legislature ahas
given the power to investigate the civil consequences of
such violations to two independent administrative
bodies: the office of the Superintendent of Elections and
the Election Law Enforcement Commission (ELEC). In
Cupano v. Gluck, 133 N.J. 225 (1993), a complaint was
filed seeking temporary restraints of a prosecutor’s
investigation into such violations and to quash subpoenas
that the prosecutor’s office had issued. The Supreme
Court held that in a second class county te prosecutor was
not required to await the result of an ELEC inquiry before
commencing a criminal investigation, and that the
prosecutor’s investigation was neither an abuse of
discretion nor arbitrary.
In the Matter of an Application for Disclosure of Grand
Jury Testimony, 124 N.J. 443 (1991), involved a motion
by the Attorney General to compel disclosure of grand
jury transcripts for use by ELEC. The Court held that
ELEC was not entitled to such disclosure concerning an
investigation into allegations that a corporation and
certain senior officials had violated provisions of the
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Reporting
Act, even after the grand jury handed up a presentment
recommending that such evidence be turned over to
ELEC, where ELEC failed to make a strong showing of
particularized need sufficient to outweigh the public
interest in preserving grand jury secrecy.
III. NOMINATIONS AND PETITIONS
In relevant part, N.J.S.A. 19:34-2 makes it a
misdemeanor punishable by up to a five year prison term
to “falsely make, falsely make oath to, or fraudulently
deface or fraudulently destroy any certificate of
nomination or petition, or any part thereof, or file, or
receive for filing, any certificate of nomination or
petition, knowing the same or any part thereof to be
falsely made, or suppress any certificate of nomination or
petition which has been duly filed, or any part thereof.”
In State v. Toland, 123 N.J. Super. 286 (App. Div.
1973)(per curiam), app. dismissed, 416 U.S. 953, 94 S.Ct.
1964 (1974), the Court held that this statutory
provision applies not only to the principal but also to a
notary public who knowingly participates in obtaining
false signatures to the verification and having then
certified as genuine. Id. at 289-90.However, the mere fact that certain individuals who
signed a nominating petition for one candidate voted for
other candidates, in the absence of evidence of fraud,
forgery or other wrongdoing, “is not, without more,
evidentiary of [the] candidate’s bad faith.” In the Ross
Petition, 116 N.J. Super. 178, 183 (App. Div. 1971).The Ross Court also relied upon the “well-
established” principal that election laws are to be given a
liberal construction in order to establish a public policy
in favor of the enfranchisement of voters. Id. at 184. Cf.
Petition of Kriso, N.J. Super. 337, 341 (App. Div.
1994)(requirement of domicile is construed broadly and
flexibly).IV. ILLEGAL VOTER REGISTRATION EVI-
DENCE
When an unqualified voter is nevertheless registered
to vote, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the individual had actual knowledge that he or she
was not qualified in order to prove criminal culpability.
Furthermore, a voter must be domiciled in New Jersey;
mere residency is insufficient. State v. Benny, 20 N.J. 238
(1955). See State v. Smith, 22 N.J. 59 (1956).V. LOSS OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
See generally, N.J.S.A. 2C:51-1 (Loss and Restoration
of Rights Incident to Conviction of an Offense). N.J.S.A.
19:4-1 denies the right to vote to persons convicted of
certain enumerated offenses. N.J.S.A. 19:4-1(8) denies
the right to vote to any person serving a sentence,
including probation, or who is on parole. This statutory
provision also applies “to all persons serving the
supervised release component of a sentence for conviction
of a federal indictable offense.” McCann v. Superintendent