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N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 criminalizes conduct which would
impair or debauch the morals of a child or cause the child
harm that would make the child abused or neglected.
This statute also prohibits child pornography.

I. IMPAIRING THE MORALS OF A CHILD

A. Definition

N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a criminalizes any sexual conduct
which would impair or debauch the morals of a child and
distinguishes between offenders in terms of their
relationship to the child as well as the age of the child.
While “sexual conduct” is not defined, it includes sexual
assaults and sexual contact proscribed in Chapter 14 of
the Code. See State v. D.R., 109 N.J. 348 (1988); State
v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112 (1987); State v. Smith, 279 N.J.
Super. 131 (App. Div. 1995); State v. Davis, 229 N.J.
Super. 66 (App. Div. 1988); State v. Hess, 198 N.J. Super.
322 (App. Div. 1984). It is not, however, limited to such
conduct. See, e.g., State v. Bottigliero, 174 N.J. Super. 101
(Resen. Panel 1980) (showing a nine-year-old child
pictures of sexual intercourse between a man and a
woman and requesting a eleven-year-old to touch
defendant’s penis constituted crimes under N.J.S.A.
2C:24-4).

In Bottigliero, the Appellate Division held that
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 is the congruent offense to N.J.S.A.
2A:96-3 (debauching or impairing the morals of a child).
Also, under Title 2A, the actual delinquency of a child
need not occur in order for the actor to be guilty of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. State v.
Norflett, 67 N.J. 268 (1975); State v. Blount, 60 N.J. 23
(1972).

In State v. Bowen, 154 N.J. Super. 368 (App. Div.
1977), certif. denied, 77 N.J. 479 (1978), defendant’s
implicit solicitation of a 14-year-old boy to engage in
homosexuality, consume alcohol and gamble, fell within
the statutory endangerment proscription, whether or not
the solicitation resulted in the actual commission of the
proposed acts.

State v. Brown, 59 N.J. 539 (1971), held that
although the actual delinquency of the child involved
need not occur, the State must prove that the child knew
of the accused’s actions or was somehow influenced by
them. On this basis, merely permitting an 11-year-old

girl to be on premises where defendant unlawfully

possessed marijuana, absent evidence that she knew of its

presence, was exposed to its use, or was encouraged to use

it, was found not to constitute contributing to the

delinquency of a child.

B. Sufficiency

In State v. D.G. 157 N.J. 112 (1999), the Supreme

Court reversed a decision by the Appellate Division that

had affirmed defendant’s convictions for sexual assault

and endangering the welfare of a child. The Court held

that an insufficient showing of particularized guarantees

of trustworthiness had attended the child victim’s report

to her relative of her stepfather’s molestations pursuant to

the tender years hearsay exception, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27).

In fact, the trial court had held no hearing to determine

if the child’s extrajudicial statements carried with them

appropriate indicia of reliability. The Supreme Court

also disagreed with the lower courts concerning the

admissibility of the second portion of the child’s

videotaped statement under the tender years exception.

It reviewed the reliability factors present as articulated in

State v. Michaels, 136 N.J. 299 (1994), finding that the

interviewing detective had assumed that the child’s

report to her relative about defendant’s molestations was

accurate and continued the interview until that report

was repeated to her satisfaction. The most damaging

allegations were provided after a seven-minute gap in the

videotape, and were not spontaneous. Thus, that portion

of the videotape occurring after the break was not

sufficiently reliable to be admitted under the tender years

hearsay exception.

C. Evidence

In State v. Hackett, 166 N.J. 66 (2001), the Court

determined that a defendant’s nudity could suffice to

support an endangering conviction if the nudity “would

impair or debauch the morals” of a child under the age of

16. Proof of actual impairing or debauching is not
    required, however, and it is sufficient if the sexual
    conduct would result in the impairing or debauching of
    an average child in the community. There is no need for
    expert testimony to establish that a defendant’s conduct
    had the tendency to impair or debauch the morals of a
    child; rather, such determination was “well within the
    abilities of an average jury” to make.

In State v. D.R., 109 N.J. 348 (1988), rev’g, 14 N.J.

Super. 278 (App. Div. 1986), the Court held that a

child’s out-of-court statements concerning acts of sexual

abuse were admissible only when the child testifies at