child, after finding that defendant did not have ongoing
and continuous care-taking responsibilities of the child.
The Court interpreted the “assumed responsibility”
requisite of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a to include only those who
assumed a general and ongoing responsibility for the
child and established a continuing or regular supervisory
or caretaker relationship with the child, but not those
who irregularly or infrequently babysit. Id. at 657-662.
A. Nature of Harm
The requisite element “harm that would make the
child an abused or neglected child,” N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a,
held not vague as applied where a 15-month-old baby
was left unattended for indefinite time. State v. M.L., 253
N.J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1991), certif. denied, 127 N.J.
560 (1992).
The requisite “harm” also found in other cases
involving child abandonment, see State v. Sanders, 230
N.J. Super. 233 (App. Div. 1989), as well as sexual
offenses, see State v. Hess, 198 N.J. Super. 322 (App. Div.
1984)
The term also includes failure of persons with
parental responsibilities to provide the child with
“proper and sufficient” medical care. State v. Bass, 221
N.J. Super. 466 (App. Div. 1987). See Schroeder v. Perkel,
87 N.J. 53 (1981).
The harm need not be physical and may be inferred
from the type of abuse or neglect inflicted upon the child.
State v. M.L., 253 N.J. Super. at 31-32. See also, New Jersey
Youth & Family Serv. v. R.Q., 273 N.J. Super. 365 (Ch.
Div. 1994) (abuse and neglect included condoning of
sexual relationship between defendant’s 13-year-old
daughter and 19-year-old boyfriend).
B. Mental Element
In State v. Demarest, 252 N.J. Super. 323 (App. Div.
1991), defendant claimed he accidentally scalded his
daughter with water from a pot on the stove. The
Appellate Division held that any non-accidental harm
could be reached in a civil child abuse actions, but
criminal conviction limited to those who act knowingly.
C. Admissibility Of Evidence
State v. Sanders [Oscar], 163 N.J. 2 (2000), affirmed
the Appellate Division majority’s reversal of defendant’s
convictions for aggravated manslaughter and endanger-
ing the welfare of a child, substantially for the reasons
expressed in 320 N.J. Super. 574 (App. Div. 1999).
There, the Appellate Division majority held that the trial
court committed reversible error when it admitted
evidence of defendant’s previous assaults upon his
girlfriend, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 404(b), to establish
intent and absence of mistake or accident with respect to
defendant’s fatal beating of their 20-month-old
daughter. State v. Sanders, 320 N.J. Super. at 580-584.
The majority also held that the trial court’s limiting
instructions were plainly erroneous because they did not
adequately explain the permissible uses of the evidence.State v. Fulston, 325 N.J. Super. 184 (App. Div.
1999), reversed defendant’s aggravated manslaughter
and endangering convictions. Defendant beat to death
his girlfriend’s one-year-old son, but his defense at trial
was that the child’s mother had done the killing. Here,
N.J.R.E. 404(b) did not bar admission of other-crimes
evidence defendant offered to illustrate that the victim’s
mother had previously abused the child and had stated
that she wished she had never given birth to him. When
defendants offer such exculpatory proofs, prejudice to
them is not an issue, and a less-rigorous standard applies
to admit such defense evidence. The “third-party guilt”
evidence defendant offered at trial was both relevant and
probative, particularly since it was obvious that either
defendant or the child’s mother had killed the child, and
the trial court’s exclusion undermined the Appellate
Division’s confidence in the verdict. Id. at 189-193.State v. Compton, 304 N.J. Super. 477 (App. Div.
1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 51 (1998), affirmed
defendant’s aggravated manslaughter and endangering
the welfare of a child convictions. The court agreed with
the trial judge that defendant’s prior abuse of the child
was admissible and relevant to the issue of whether his
son’s death was accidental and found requisite limiting
instruction adequate as given. Also, Shaken Baby
Syndrome held to be a fitting subject for expert
testimony, resting as it did upon reliable scientific
premises. Id. at 485-488.