Johnson, 90 N.J. Super. 105, 113-115 (App. Div. 1965),
aff’d, 46 N.J. 289, 291 (1966). The Brown Court noted:
While the proper foundation for the admission of such
real evidence requires a showing of an uninterrupted
chain of possession, it is not necessary for the party
introducing such evidence to negate every possibility of
substitution or change in condition between the event
and the time of trial, especially where as here, the
custodian has been an arm of the State. The question is
one of reasonable probability that no tampering has
occurred.
Generally it is sufficient if the court finds in reasonable
probability that the evidence has not been changed in
important respects, ... or is in substantially the same
condition as when the crime was committed. [99 N.J.
Super. at 27-28].
The principles announced in Brown were more
recently endorsed by the Supreme Court in State v.
Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 393 (1993).
Even where the chain of possession is not established
with absolute certainty, there must be some verified
suggestion of irregularity or tampering to warrant
exclusion of the evidence. See also, State v. Roszkowski,
129 N.J. Super. 315, 317 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 66
N.J. 325 (1974); State v. Brown, 99 N.J. Super. at 28.
Generally, however, such concerns go to the weight of the
evidence, and not its admissibility. State v. Morton, 155
N.J. 386, 447 (1998). Morton involved the admission of
a pair of surgical gloves recovered near the crime scene,
one of which contained a tear in one finger. The Supreme
Court had no problem approving the admission of the
evidence, given the testimony of the law enforcement
custodians that they did not tamper with the evidence
and the cross-examination which raised the possibility
that the tear had nonetheless occurred in their possession.
Id.
If an item is not fungible, but rather easily
identifiable, no viable chain of custody issue is presented.
State v. Hoffman, 290 N.J. Super. 588, 595 (App. Div.
1996), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 149 N.J. 564 (1997).
In State v. Binns, 222 N.J. Super. 583 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 111 N.J. 624 (1988), the court found that
the Brown standard had been satisfied in a case where the
arresting officer had failed to initial drug distribution
paraphernalia and the container holding cocaine, both
found in a car trunk. The officer at trial testified that he
recognized all the items as those taken from the trunk and
based on the chain of evidence usually employed he
would be able to identify the items. Another detective
testified that he had taken the items from the arresting
officer and placed them in an evidence locker until trial.IV. CHARACTER EVIDENCE (See also,
CREDIBILITY and BIAS, infra)
As a general rule, character evidence or a trait of
character intended to prove that a person acted on a
specific occasion in conformity with that character or trait
is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions
of the rules. N.J.R.E. 404(a). One exception is that
character evidence offered by an accused cannot be
excluded under N.J.R.E. 403, formerly Evid. R. 4. Thus,
in State v. Taylor, 226 N.J. Super. 441 (App. Div. 1988),
the defendant was permitted to introduce evidence of his
character, but the trial court precluded evidence offered
by the defendant of the character of the sexual assault
victim, her mother, and her aunt under former Evid. R.- The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that
the absolute right of a defendant to introduce character
evidence unlimited by Evid. R. 4 considerations is
confined to character evidence relating to the defendant
himself. The Taylor court did not specifically determine
whether the trial court’s exclusion of the character
testimony under Evid. R. 4 grounds was proper, as it held
that any error was harmless under the facts of the case.
Once a defendant has introduced evidence of his
good character, the State may introduce rebuttal
evidence to the contrary, but a trial court may limit such
evidence by the State. See also State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330,
339 (1989). However, in State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508
(1982), the Supreme Court affirmed an Appellate
Division decision holding inadmissible the proffered
expert testimony of a psychiatrist to the effect that the
defendant accused of rape did not have the psychological
traits of a rapist. The Court found that the proffered
testimony was relevant in that it could be inferred that
one who has the character of a non-rapist did not commit
rape on the charged occasion. Id. However, the evidence
was inadmissible under former Evid. R. 56(2) since the
testimony did not satisfy the standard of acceptability for
scientific evidence.Evidence of good character may itself raise a
reasonable doubt as to a defendant’s guilt. State v.
Siciliano, 21 N.J. 249, 260-61 (1956). An instruction
on the effect of character evidence should be given. In
State v. Bogus, 223 N.J. Super. 409 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 111 N.J. 567 (1988), the defendant claimed that
the trial court failed to specifically instruct the jury that