Determinations of the admissibility of evidence is to
be made by the standard of simple relevance to guilt or
innocence. State v. Fulston, 325 N.J. Super. 184, 190
(App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 397 (2000),
citing State v. Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 452-53 (1978).
Therefore, a defendant is entitled to introduce any
evidence that will “rationally tend to refute his guilt or
buttress his innocence of the charge made.” State v.
Gookins, 135 N.J. 42, 47 (1994).
For a lengthy discussion of relevance, as it pertains to
excluding evidence of a defendant offered to show the
possibility that others committed the offenses with
which he is charged, see State v. Allison, 208 N.J. Super. 9
(App. Div. 1985). The defendant, indicted on multiple
arson counts, wished to argue at trial that drug addicts
could have caused the fires. In support of this proposition
the defendant offered testimony that, two months prior
to the fires, a witness observed flammable drug
paraphernalia on the roof of the building which later
caught fire. The trial court’s exclusion of this evidence
was sustained by the Appellate Division. While the
reviewing court agreed that the defendant’s proposition
was material (i.e., that drug addicts and not defendant
started the fires), there was considerable doubt about
whether the isolated facts offered by the defendant were
probative (i.e., evidence of flammable drug paraphernalia
would not sufficiently support, on its own, the inference
that drug addicts set the fires).
Evidence should be excluded if it has a inflammatory
potential that will likely divert a jury from making a fair
and reasonable evaluation of defendant’s guilt or
innocence. N.J.R.E. 403; State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295,
358 (1996); State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421 (1971).
Ultimately, the determination of the admissibility of
relevant evidence falls within the broad discretion of the
trial court. State v. Catlow, 206 N.J. Super. 186, 193
(App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 103 N.J. 465 (1996).
XXVII. REPUTATION (See also CREDIBILITY
and BIAS, supra)
N.J.R.E. 803(c)(19), formerly covered by Evid. R.
63(26) and 63(27)(c), allows evidence of personal
history and family matters to be proved by reputation. In
State v. Perez, 150 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div. 1977),
certif. denied, 75 N.J. 542 (1977), a defendant was
charged with gambling offenses. The State presented
evidence that a person who was identified as “Cenizo” was
involved in the offenses. Subsequently, the State offered
evidence that the defendant’s nickname in the
community was “Cenizo”. The Appellate Division held
that this evidence was admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule because it was proof of defendant’s
reputation in the community for being know as
“Cenizo”.N.J.R.E. 803(c)(21), formerly Evid. R. 63(28),
permits evidence of reputation of a person’s character at
a relevant time among the person’s associates or in the
community. The reputation of a victim of an assault for
aggressiveness has long been permitted where a
defendant claiming self-defense is aware of the victim’s
“pugnacious reputation.” State v. Burgess, 141 N.J. Super.
13, 16 (App. Div. 1976). More recently, however, the
Appellate Division has held that even if the defendant is
unaware of the victim’s reputation, such evidence, as well
as evidence of a conviction for an assaultive crime, is
admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(a)(2), 405, and
803(c)(21) to demonstrate the character of the victim to
show that the victim was the aggressor. State v. Aguiar,
322 N.J. Super. 175, 183-84 (App. Div. 1999).XXVIII. RES GESTAE
N.J.R.E. 404(b) does not apply when evidence of
other crimes or acts is part of the total criminal conduct
occurring during the incident in question and thus may
be considered within the res gestae of the charged crime.
State v. Cherry, 289 N.J. Super. 503, 522 (App. Div.
1995); State v. Ortiz, 253 N.J. Super. 239, 243 (App.
Div. 1992), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 6 (1992). Such
evidence is admissible without limitation if it serves to
establish the context of the criminal event, explains the
nature of it, or presents the full picture of the crime to the
jury. State v. Martini I, 131 N.J. 176, 242 (1993), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 875 (1995); State v. Torres, 313 N.J.
Super. 129, 160-61 (App. Div. 1998), certif. denied, 156
N.J. 425 (1998); State v. Cherry, supra. Since it is not
other crimes evidence, no limiting instruction is
required. State v. Martini I, supra; State v. Torres, 313 N.J.
Super. at 161; State v. Cherry, supra.XXIX. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EVI-
DENCE (See also, EXPERT WITNESS, JUDICIAL
NOTICE, supra)
Expert testimony is admissible if the scientific
technique or mode of analysis has “a sufficient scientific
basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results
so as to contribute materially to the ascertainment of the
truth.” State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 210 (1984); Romano
v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 80 (1984). The standard of
reliability, applicable to all fields of science, is designed