is not absolute but rather subject to those reasonable
limitations (i.e. time, place, manner) which the trial
judge may impose in the interest of the fair
administration of justice. The Court distinguished
Gannett on the ground that it involved a pretrial motion
rather than a trial.
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596 (1982), the Court held that a State statute which
required, under all circumstances, exclusion of the press
and general public from the courtroom during the
testimony of minor victims in sex offense trials violated
the First Amendment, as applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. Richmond Newspapers
established for the first time that the press and the general
public have a constitutional right to access to criminal
trials. The First Amendment protection is afforded both
because criminal trials have historically been open to the
press and the public and because such right of access plays
a significant role in the functioning of the judicial process
and the government as a whole. While this right is not
absolute, the circumstances under which the press and
the public can be barred are limited. The State must
show that denial of such right is necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. The statute herein
requiring mandatory closure could not be justified on the
basis of either the State’s interest in protecting minor
victims of sex crimes from further trauma and
embarrassment or its interest in encouraging such victims
to come forward and testify in a truthful and credible
manner. The Court noted that there may very well be
individual cases where closure may be proper during the
testimony of minor sex offense victims, but found that the
mandatory rule herein requiring no particularized
determinations in individual cases, was unconstitutional.
The Court extended the right of access to the pretrial
proceeding of jury selection. In Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court of California, Riverside County, 464 U.S.
501 (1984), a review of the historical evidence revealed
that, since the development of trial by jury, the process
of selection of jurors has presumptively been a public
process. This openness enhances both the fairness of the
criminal trial and the appearance of fairness essential to
public confidence. Therefore, closed proceedings,
although not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only
for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness.
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by
an overriding interest based on findings that closure is
essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest. Furthermore, the interest is to be
articulated along with findings specific enough that a
reviewing court can determine whether the closure order
was properly entered. Absent consideration of
alternatives to closure, the trial court could not
constitutionally close the voir dire. Finally, when limited
closure is ordered, the constitutional values sought to be
protected by holding open proceedings may be satisfied
by making a transcript of closed proceeding available
within a reasonable time, if the judge determines that
disclosure can be accomplished while safeguarding the
jurors valid privacy interests. Even then the judge may
determine that certain parts of the transcript should be
sealed, or the name of the juror withheld, to protect the
person from embarrassment. Inasmuch as the trial judge
herein did not consider alternatives to closure and refused
to release any portion of the transcripts, the underlying
decision was vacated and remanded.Finally, in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), the
Court held that the defendant’s right to a public trial
applied to a suppression hearing. Accordingly, the Court
held that under the Sixth Amendment, any closure of a
suppression hearing over the objections of the accused
must meet the tests set out in Press-Enterprise and its
predecessors.- New Jersey Supreme Court cases
In State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39 (1983), the New
Jersey Supreme Court enunciated guidelines for New
Jersey courts to follow when evaluating closure
applications. Considering whether and under what
circumstances pretrial proceedings in a criminal matter
can be closed to the public and the press, the Court held
that the only exception to open pretrial proceedings will
arise if there is a realistic likelihood of prejudice to a fair
trial by an impartial jury as a result of adverse publicity
and further, that such prejudice cannot be overcome by
resort to various methods relating to the selection of
jurors that will be available to the court at the time of trial.
Id. at 63. Due to the lack of a dispositive United States
Supreme Court decision, the right to access rested on the
State Constitution. A defendant seeking closure is
required to make an application in order to show that fair
trial rights will be jeopardized by recognizing the public
and press rights to open court proceedings. The
application should be supported by evidence of extensive
prior adverse publicity in the case that, together with the
adverse publicity anticipated from open pretrial
proceedings, is sufficient to support an inference that the
publicity anticipated from open pretrial proceedings will
create bias in the minds of potential jurors as to the guilt
of the defendant or as to any material issue in the case.
The defendant bears the burden of proof by a