upon vacant premises was not a reasonable time, place
and manner regulation and was, therefore, violative of the
newspaper’s First Amendment rights. Specifically, the
ordinance prohibited distribution “... in or upon any
private premises which are temporarily or continuously
uninhabited or vacant.” The Court held that the
language of the ordinance was vague. Finally, the Court
noted that there were not “ample” alternatives available
to the newspaper, within Franklin Lakes, to disseminate
its newspaper.
- News Racks
In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410 (1993), commercial publishers requested
declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of
city ordinance prohibiting distribution of “commercial
handbills” on public property, used as basis for ordering
removal of news racks. The Supreme Court held that: (1)
ban on news racks containing “commercial handbills,”
which did not apply to news racks containing
“newspapers” was not a “reasonable fit” with city’s
legitimate interest in safety and esthetics and means
chosen to serve interest; and (2) enforcement did not
constitute a valid time, place, and manner restriction of
protected speech, as it was not content-neutral.
News Printing Co. v. Borough of Totowa, 211 N.J.
Super. 121 (Law Div. 1986). The Borough of Totowa
enacted an ordinance which, inter alia, required that a
newspaper company obtain a permit prior to placing a
news rack in a public area. An annual permit fee was also
required as well as mandatory liability insurance for
damages arising out of personal and property damage
related to use of the news rack. The trial court concluded
that such regulation placed a prior restraint on the
distribution and circulation of newspapers in violation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court did,
however, agree that the borough could enact reasonable
regulations for the placement of each news rack and could
also charge reasonable fees which served to defray
administration and inspection costs.
- Demonstrations and Protests
In Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S.Ct. 2480
147 L.Ed. 2d 597 (2000), abortion opponents sought
declaration that criminal statute prohibiting any person
from knowingly approaching within eight feet of another
person near health care facility without that person’s
consent violated First Amendment. The Supreme Court
held that: (1) statute was narrowly-tailored time, place,
and manner regulation; (2) statute was not overbroad or
unconstitutionally vague; and (3) statute did not impose
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.In Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357
(1997), health care providers sought a preliminary
injunction prohibiting abortion protestors from
engaging in allegedly illegal efforts to prevent women
from obtaining abortions and other family planning
services. The Supreme Court held that: (1) preliminary
injunction was not unlawful prior restraint on free
speech; (2) governmental interests in ensuring public
safety and order, promoting free flow of traffic, protecting
property rights, and protecting woman’s freedom to seek
pregnancy-related services, were significant enough to
justify appropriately tailored preliminary injunction to
secure unimpeded access to clinics; (3) floating buffer
zones requiring protestors to stay 15 feet from people and
vehicles entering and leaving clinics violated First
Amendment by burdening more speech than was
necessary to serve relevant governmental interests; (4)
fixed buffer zones requiring abortion protestors to remain
15 feet from clinic doorways, driveways, and driveway
entrances were necessary to ensure access; and (5)
preliminary injunction’s “cease and desist” provision,
allowing patients to require sidewalk counselors to retreat
and remain outside fixed buffer zones, was not contrary
to First Amendment.In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S.
753 (1994), operators of health clinic that performed
abortions sought to broaden a previously entered
injunction against anti-abortion protestors, complaining
that access to a clinic was still impeded by protestors’
activities and that such activities had also discouraged
some potential patients from entering the clinic, and had
deleterious physical effects on others. The Supreme
Court held that: (1) fact that injunction restricted speech
of only anti-abortion protestors did not make it content
based; (2) content-neutral injunction would be upheld if
its challenged provisions burdened no more speech than
necessary to serve significant government interests; (3)
provisions of injunction establishing 36-foot buffer zone
around clinic entrances and driveway and imposing
limited noise restrictions did not violate First
Amendment; and (4) provisions of injunction
establishing 36-foot buffer zone on private property,
banning observable images, establishing 300-foot no-
approach zone around clinic, and establishing 300-foot
buffer zone around staff residences burdened more
speech than necessary to serve government interests.Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), held
unconstitutional a provision of the Washington, D.C.