code making it unlawful to display within 500 feet of a
foreign embassy any sign tending to bring a foreign
government into public odium or public disrepute. The
Court found the clause was facially violative of the First
Amendment because it was a content-based restriction
on political speech taking place in a public forum and was
not narrowly drawn to serve a compelling State interest.
The Court upheld another provision of the Code,
modified by the Court of Appeals, making it unlawful for
crowds demonstrating within 500 feet of a foreign
embassy to fail to disperse at the request of a police officer
when the police reasonably believe that a threat to the
security or peace of the embassy is threatened. The Court
found that this clause, as modified by the Court of
Appeals, was not vague or overboard.
In Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), abortion
protesters brought suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of
a municipal ordinance prohibiting picketing before or
about residence or dwelling of any individual. The
Supreme Court held that: (1) the ordinance does not ban
all picketing in residential areas, but, rather, prohibits
only focused picketing taking place in front of residences;
and (2) the ordinance serves the significant government
interest of protecting residential privacy, is narrowly
tailored, and, thus, does not violate the First
Amendment.
National Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S.
43 (1977), reversed the denial of a stay of an order that
would have prevented a Nazi organization from staging a
demonstration in a largely Jewish suburb.
Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970),
reversed the conviction of anti-war protesters, because it
was demonstrated that their convictions may have been
caused by a charge to the jury which allowed a finding of
guilt upon the ground that the protester’s views
concerning the Vietnam War may have been deemed
offensive by some of the spectators.
In Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 3 (1967), university
students who attended a demonstration at a jail
concerning the arrest of fellow students who had
previously protested were themselves arrested. The
Court distinguished this situation from Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), and Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965), on a variety of grounds. In
Edwards, the demonstration occurred near the State
Capitol which was open to the public. Jails, built for
security purposes, are not. The trespass statute in
question was clearly defined and nothing prevented
Florida “from even-handed enforcement of its general
trespass statute against those refusing to obey the sheriff’s
order to remove themselves from what amounted to the
curtilege of the jail house.” The State was empowered to
preserve its property for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated. No constitutional right exists to protest
whenever and however a citizen pleases.In Murray v. Lawson, 136 N.J. 32 (1994), vacated
513 U.S. 802, 115 S.Ct. 44 (1994), on remand 138 N.J.
206 (1994), cert. denied 515 U.S. 1110, 115 S.Ct. 2264
(1995), physicians sought to enjoin anti-abortion
protestors from picketing in front of their residences.
Trial court entered permanent injunction in favor of one
physician and granted restraining order with respect to
the other. Protestors appealed. The Supreme Court held
that: (1) trial judges had power to enjoin nonviolent,
noncriminal activity of protestors to protect physicians’
residential property; (2) restrictions were content-
neutral; (3) the State has common-law public policy in
favor of protecting residential privacy, and enforcement
of that policy constitutes a significant government
interest justifying imposition of injunctive restrictions;
(4) injunction prohibiting protestors from picketing
within 300 feet of physician’s residence was narrowly
tailored place restriction; but (5) injunction prohibiting
protestors from picketing within immediate vicinity of
physician’s residence was not sufficiently narrowly
tailored, warranting remand for more precise definition
of ban’s spacial scope.In Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J. 126
(1994), a family planning clinic sought to enjoin
activities of anti-abortion protestors. The trial court
issued a permanent injunction, and protestors appealed.
The Supreme court held that: (1) trial court had
authority to impose reasonable injunctive restrictions on
peaceful expressive activities of protestors; (2) injunction
was content-neutral; (3) injunction served significant
government interests; (4) injunction’s “manner”
restriction was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
address actual problem of noise; (5) “place” restriction
prohibiting trespass and obstruction of access was
sufficiently narrowly tailored, while restriction requiring
protestors to stay across street from clinic was too broad;
and (6) after modification, injunction would provide
adequate alternative channels of communication for
protestors.In State v. Brown, 212 N.J. Super. 61 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 107 N.J. 53 (1986), defendant challenged
her conviction for criminal trespass resulting from her
participation in an anti-abortion demonstration at a
multi-business office complex, on First Amendment