grounds. Defendant’s conviction was upheld, the Court
concluding that the owner of the complex had not
sufficiently dedicated the property to public use to
entitle access for First Amendment activity under the
New Jersey Constitution. In so doing, the Court refused
to take a more expansive view of New Jersey’s
Constitution than that applied to the United States First
Amendment provision.
In State v. Kirk, 84 N.J. Super. 151 (Cty. Ct. 1964),
aff’d, 88 N.J. Super. 130 (App. Div. 1965), defendants
entered the waiting room of the City of Newark air
terminal operated by the Port of New York Authority to
picket the ticket counter of the airline, after having been
denied permission to do so. The Court held that they
were neither invitees nor licensees, but were trespassers
who were guilty of willful trespass. The operation and
conduct of the facility was akin to that of a private
business operation and the Port Authority could
prosecute a trespasser on its premises. Defendants could
have picketed at other less disruptive partes of the
building and would still have been able to communicate
their message.
D. Campaigning, Canvassing And Soliciting
- Campaigning
In California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567,
120 S.Ct. 2402 (2000), an action was brought
challenging constitutionality of California proposition
which converted the State’s primary election from closed
to blanket primary in which voters could vote for any
candidate regardless of voter’s or candidate’s party
affiliation. Held: The blanket primary violated political
parties’ First Amendment right of association.
In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528
U.S. 377 (2000), a political action committee and
unsuccessful candidate in primary for Missouri state
auditor brought suit challenging provisions of Missouri’s
campaign finance law limiting amount of contributions
to candidates. The Supreme Court held that: (1)
decision in Buckley v. Valeo is authority for state limits on
campaign contributions; (2) Missouri statute limiting
campaign contributions for various state offices was not
void for lack of evidence, and was sufficiently tailored to
serve its purposes, as required to survive First
Amendment scrutiny; and (3) statute was not invalid
based on fact that, accounting for inflation, Missouri’s
contribution limits may have been effectively lower in
real dollar value than those campaign contribution limits
upheld in Buckley.
In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law
Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999), a nonprofit
public interest organizations and individuals who
regularly participated in Colorado’s initiative and
referendum petition process brought § 1983 action
against state officials, challenging statutes regulating
petition process. The court held that: (1) statute
requiring that initiative-petition circulators be registered
voters violated First Amendment; (2) statute requiring
that initiative-petition circulators wear identification
badge bearing the circulator’s name violated First
Amendment; and (3) statute requiring that proponents
of an initiative report names and addresses of all paid
circulators and amount paid to each circulator violated
First Amendment.In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998), an independent political
candidate brought against a state-owed public television
broadcaster, alleging that his exclusion from a candidate
debate violated the First Amendment. The Supreme
Court held that the debate was a nonpublic forum from
which the broadcaster could exclude the candidate in the
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of its journalistic
discretion.In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S.
351 (1997), a minor political party challenged
constitutionality of Minnesota’s antifusion laws
prohibiting candidates from appearing on ballot as
candidate of more than one political party. The Supreme
Court held that antifusion laws did not violate party’s
First and Fourteenth Amendment associational rights.In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee
v. Federal Election Commission, 518 U.S. 604 (1996), the
Federal Election Commission brought an action against
state political party for violating spending limits under
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). The Court held
that First Amendment prohibits application of FECA’s
party expenditure provision to expenditure that political
party has made independently, without coordination
with any candidate.In Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), a
political party worker sought to enjoin enforcement of
state statute prohibiting solicitation of votes and display
of campaign materials within 100 feet of entrance to
polling place on election day. The Supreme Court held
that statute was narrowly tailored to serve compelling
state interest in preventing voter intimidation and
election fraud.