In United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990),
defendants were convicted of soliciting contributions on
sidewalk in front of Post Office in violation of Postal
Service regulation. The Supreme Court held that: (1)
postal sidewalk was not traditional public forum, nor had
Postal Service expressly dedicated sidewalk to any
expressive activity; and (2) Postal Service regulation
prohibiting solicitation on postal premises, as applied to
members of political advocacy group who were soliciting
contributions, selling books and newspaper subscrip-
tions and distributing political literature on sidewalk
near Post Office entrance, did not violate free speech
protections of First Amendment, under reasonableness
test.
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). Under
Colorado law, citizens are permitted to place
propositions on the ballot through an initiative process.
The law made it a felony to pay any person, corporation
or association to circulate an initiative petition.
Respondent, a proponent of a measure that would
exempt motor carriers from the jurisdiction of the public
utilities commission, brought an action against state
officials alleging that the prohibition against paid
circulators violated the First Amendment. The Supreme
Court unanimously agreed, holding that an initiative
petition is core political speech; thus, any prohibition is
subject to exacting scrutiny under the First Amendment.
The Court found that the statute hindered respondent’s
speech by limiting the amount of people who could
spread the message, and made it less likely that
respondent could obtain the necessary amount of
signatures to satisfy the initiative requirement. The
Court ruled that the State failed to meet its burden that
the prohibition advanced a substantial state interest
sufficient to outweigh respondent’s First Amendment
rights because other alternatives, such as laws requiring a
certain amount of signatures on the ballot, satisfied the
State interest in preserving the integrity of the initiative
process. Additionally, the state failed to show that paid
circulators were any more likely to interfere with the
integrity of the initiative process than volunteers.
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North
Carolina, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), charitable organiza-
tions, professional charitable solicitors and others
challenged constitutionality of law regarding solicitation
of funds for charitable purposes. The Supreme Court
held that: (1) statute was subject to review under strict
scrutiny standard; (2) state’s definition of reasonable fee,
using percentages, was not narrowly tailored to state’s
interest in preventing fraud; (3) requirement that
professional fund raisers disclose a potential donor’s
percentage of charitable contributions collected during
previous year which were actually turned over to charity
was unduly burdensome and unconstitutional; and (4)
licensing requirement for professional fund raisers was
unconstitutional.In Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Oradell,
66 N.J. 376 (1975), rev’d, 425 U.S. 610 (1976),
plaintiffs challenged an ordinance that required that any
person desiring to canvass, solicit, or call from house to
house for a recognized charitable cause, or for a political
campaign or cause, furnish local police departments with
advance written notification for the purpose of
identification. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that
the requirements of the statute were easily satisfied. The
only requirement was one of identification. It need be
fulfilled only once each campaign, and there was no fee
involved. The applicant did not have to obtain a card or
carry a license. Significantly, no discretion reposes in any
municipal official to deny the privilege of calling from
door to door. The ordinance was plainly an identification
device in its most basic form. In this instance, the sole
requirement is that the requirements be reasonable.
Identification in this case would aid the community in
securing itself against break-ins and illegal entries into
private homes, and was not an interference with First
Amendment rights. It was not a prior restraint on the
rights of free speech and assembly. The United States
Supreme Court reversed and remanded this decision,
holding that the ordinance in question was unconstitu-
tionally vague, despite the State court’s limiting
construction that the identification requirement might
be satisfied by resort to the mails. While a municipality
can regulate soliciting and canvassing to protect its
citizens from crime and annoyance, the ordinance must
be narrowly drawn.In Borough of Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66 N.J. 350
(1975), appeal dismissed, 426 U.S. 901 (1976), an
identification requirement of an ordinance prohibiting
canvassing or soliciting without first registering with the
chief of police, and procuring a permit was sufficiently
reasonable and neutral to withstand a First Amendment
constitutional attack. It was a legitimate tool in the hands
of the municipality, particularly as applied to the
conduct of defendants engaged in canvassing house-to-
house in connection with a survey of listener preferences
for radio stations. The Court additionally held that
speech is not unprotected by the Constitution merely
because it is uttered by a corporation as opposed to an
individual or because it serves economic purposes of the
corporate entity.