International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority, 691 F.2d 155
(3d Cir. 1982). Invoking the First Amendment, ISKON
challenged a policy that prohibits any outside
organizations from soliciting money at the race track and
stadium in the Meadowlands Sports Complex. The
Court noted the distinction between valid restrictions on
First Amendment activity in a public versus a non-public
forum. In a public forum, First Amendment activity may
be restricted only by “reasonable time, place or manner
regulations that serve a governmental interest and leave
open ample alternative channels for communication.”
On the other hand, the government may prohibit all
forms of communication in a non-public forum “so long
as the ban is reasonable and content-neutral.” The
primary factor in determining whether property owned
by the government is a public forum is how the locale is
used. The Court reasoned that the Meadowlands
Complex is a commercial venture by the State and does
not fit any of the accepted descriptions of a public forum.
The next step is to determine if the policy is reasonable,
i.e., whether the proposed activity is basically
incompatible with the normal character and function of
the Meadowlands, and whether the policy si uniform and
non-discriminatory. The Court, in upholding the
policy, found that it was both reasonable and content-
neutral.
- Voters’ Rights
In Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186
(1996), registered voters wishing to become delegates to
a political party’s state convention to nominate a
candidate for United States Senator challenged the
party’s requirement that persons wishing to become
delegates pay a registration fee. the Supreme Court held
that: (1) the party was “acting under authority explicitly
or implicitly granted by a covered jurisdiction,” for
purposes of the regulation making a political party’s
change that affects voting subject to the preclearance
requirement, when it adopted a filing fee for delegates to
the state nominating convention; (2) a filing fee for party
delegates operates in precisely the same fashion as other
practices covered by the preclearance requirement and,
thus, requires preclearance; and (3) a private right of
action exists to enforce the Voting Rights Act section that
prohibits a poll tax.
E. Actions And Conduct Which Constitute Symbolic
Speech
In Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), defendant
was convicted of desecration of venerated object after he
burned an American flag during a protest rally. The
Supreme Court held that: (1) defendant’s conduct was
expressive conduct within protection of the First
Amendment; and (2) State could not justify prosecution
of defendant based upon its interest in preventing
breaches of peace and preserving the flag as a symbol of
nationhood and national unity.United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) struck
down the federal Flag Burning Act as violative of the First
Amendment.Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence
(CCNV), 468 U.S. 288 (1984), held that a National Park
regulation prohibiting camping in certain parks did not
violate the First Amendment, though applied to prohibit
demonstrators from sleeping in Lafayette Park and the
Mall in connection with a demonstration which was
intended to call attention to the plight of the homeless.
The Court first acknowledged that sleeping in
connection with the demonstration was “expressive
conduct protected to some extent by the First
Amendment.” However, the Court held that the
regulations forbidding sleeping were defensible as a time,
place or manner restriction of expression, whether oral,
written or symbolized by conduct. The Court reasoned
that the park service neither attempted to ban sleeping
generally nor to ban it everywhere in the parks. The park
service had established areas where camping was allowed
and areas where it was not. Further, the Court found that
the regulations were content-neutral. Additionally, the
message could be communicated in other ways, chief of
which was the demonstration in progress with its
symbolic city, signs, and the presence of those who were
willing to take their turns in a day-and-night vigil.
Finally, the Court found that the regulations narrowly
focused on the Government’s substantial interest in
maintaining the parks in the heart of the capital.Spence v. State of Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974),
held that a Washington state statute forbidding
improper use of the flag is unconstitutional as applied to
a college student who, to protest the then-recent
Cambodian intervention, displayed an inverted flag on
which a peace symbol was superimposed. The plurality
declared that such a use of the flag is closely analogous to
the manner in which flags have always been used to
convey ideas and is protected under the First
Amendment. Cf. Smith v. Gougen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974);
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1976).Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Defendant, who was in a county courthouse, was arrested