limit access of minors to such messages and did not
survive constitutional scrutiny.
In Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46
(1989), an adult bookstore operator was charged with
violating Indiana’s RICO statute. Held: (1) Indiana’s
RICO statute was not unconstitutionally vague as
applied to obscenity predicate offenses with which
bookstore owner was charged, but (2) pretrial seizure of
bookstore owner’s books and files, based on finding of
probable cause, before there had been any judicial
determination that seized items were obscene or that
RICO violation had occurred, violated First Amend-
ment.
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
Forfeiture of defendant’s assets, used in adult
entertainment business, following conviction for
participating in racketeering activities in violation of
RICO, did not violate defendant’s First Amendment
rights.
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
First Amendment did not preclude the closing down of
an adult bookstore, pursuant to generally applicable
statute, on the basis that solicitation of prostitution was
occurring on the premises.
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991),
a public decency statute requiring that dancers at adult
entertainment establishments wear pasties and G-strings
did not violate the First Amendment.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Expression
that is obscene is unprotected by the First Amendment
and may be banned by the states. For a work to be
“obscene,” all three parts of the following test must be
met: first, the average person, applying community
standards, must find that the work appeals to the
“prurient” interest. Second, the work must depict or
describe, in a “patently offensive way,” particular types of
sexual conduct as defined by state law. Third, the work,
taken as a whole, must lack “serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.”
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The mere
private possession of obscene material by an adult may
not be made criminal.
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). The States
may criminalize even private possession of child
pornography.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942),
upheld a conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness for addressing
the City Marshall as a “damned Fascist” and a “God
damned racketeer” under a statute prohibiting persons
from addressing “any offensive, derisive, or annoying
word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or
other public place.In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205
(1975), defendant was charged with violating an
ordinance that prohibits a drive-in movie theater from
showing films containing nudity when its screen is visible
from a public street or place. The Court held that while
a State or municipality may protect individual privacy by
enacting reasonable time, place and manner regulations
applicable to all speech irrespective of content, the
government cannot, absent a showing that substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner, act as a censor, selectively shielding
the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that
they are more offensive than others. The Court noted
that any viewer on the street that would be offended
could simply “avert his eyes.” The Court invalidated the
ordinance inasmuch as it did not satisfy the rigorous
constitutional standards that apply when government
attempts to regulate expression.F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
A broadcaster may be deprived of his license and his
forum if the Federal Communications Commission
decides that such an action would serve the public
interest. Patently offensive, indecent material presented
over the airways confronts the citizen, not only in public,
but also in the privacy of the home, “where the
individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the
First Amendment rights of an intruder.” See Rowan v.
United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970);
F.C.C. v. League of Woman Voters of California, 468 U.S.
364 (1984).Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532 (1998).
Off-duty firefighter appealed after he was suspended for
directing a racial epithet at a police officer during a traffic
stop. Held: the racial epithet was not protected under the
First Amendment.In State in Interest of W.E.C., 165 N.J. Super. 161
(App. Div. 1979), rev’d in part on other grounds, 81 N.J.
442 (1979), a juvenile defendant was charged with using
loud and offensive language in two acts of assault and
battery on a police officer. Defendant was found guilty
of delinquency on all charges, and he was given
indeterminate sentences at Yardville. Appellant