subsequent offense, a prior offense on which defendant
already has served the sentence.
State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113 (1988), explained
proof by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant
is a repetitive and compulsive offender is sufficient to
satisfy due process when sentencing defendant to a term
at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center (ADTC).
Since defendant’s “liberty interest” implicated by the
sentence is weak due to the fact an ADTC term is not
necessarily longer than a prison term, but the state’s
interest in rehabilitation the sex offender is substantial, in
balancing the countervailing interests due process will
not demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In N.J. Parole Bd v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192 (1983), the
Court, against a due process challenge, sustained the
1979 Parole Act’s framework of classifying multiple
offenders for parole eligibility purposes, but construed
the statute to provide constitutionally required
procedural guarantees. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.5j and
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53a, taken together, create a
protected liberty interest under the due process clause as
to when inmates are eligible for parole. The court
enumerated procedural requirements that must be
followed by the prosecutor or sentencing judge if either
seeks to delay an offender’s parole release date because the
punitive aspects of the sentence have not been fulfilled.
State v. Bianco, 103 N.J. 383 (1986), held
defendant’s due process rights are not infringed by the
Appellate Division’s excessive sentence oral argument
program. The fact that no briefs are submitted, no
transcription of the proceeding is made, (it is tape
recorded, R. 2:9-11), and no formal order is issued, does
not constitute a due process violation since the court is
provided with all relevant documents from below, hears
oral argument, confers and then issues orders with a brief
statement of reasons, thereby providing defendants with
a meaningful opportunity to present their cases.
I. Void for Vagueness and Overbreadth
State v Allen, 334 N.J. Super. 133 (Law. Div. 2000).
Whether law is unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness
is essentially a procedural due process concept grounded
in notions of fair play; vagueness test demands that a law
be sufficiently clear and precise so that people are given
adequate warning of the law’s reach, and that law
enforcement is not so uncertain as to become arbitrary.
Where the prohibited behavior is not susceptible to a
precise definition, the vagueness doctrine should not lead
to legislative paralysis. When interpreting criminal
statutes, court looks to common definitions, the context
of the words that they are associated with in the statute,
and the intent of the Legislature. Absent any explicit
indications of special meanings, the words used in the
statute carry their ordinary and well understood
meanings.Bias crimes statutes, to extent they enhanced degree
of assault and harassment and enhanced punishment for
other offenses committed against victim with “handi-
cap,” but did not define that term, were not
unconstitutionally vague on their face or as applied to
crimes committed against victim who was learning
disabled, of low I.Q., exceptionally short, deaf in one ear,
speech impaired, and who had a pin hole in his heart.The void for vagueness doctrine rests on procedural
due process principles and examines whether a law is
sufficiently clear so that citizens have adequate notice of
the proscribed conduct and law enforcement officers have
adequate guidelines to prevent arbitrary and discrimina-
tory enforcement.The overbreadth doctrine rests on principles of
substantive due process and examines whether the reach
of the law extends farther than permitted or necessary to
fulfill the State’s interest, i.e., does the statute inhibit
constitutionally protected conduct as well as unpro-
tected conduct. Vagueness and overbreadth are often
both argued in the same cases.United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997),
explained that there are three related manifestations of
the “fair warning requirement”: first, the “vagueness
doctrine” bars enforcement of a statute which either
forbids or requires doing of an act in terms so vague that
people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application; second, the
“canon of strict construction of criminal statutes,” or
“rule of lenity,” ensures fair warning by so resolving
ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to
conduct clearly covered; and third, although clarity at the
requisite level may be supplied by a judicial gloss on
otherwise uncertain statute, due process bars courts from
applying novel construction of a criminal statute to
conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial
decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope. In each
of these guises, the touchstone is whether the statute,
either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably
clear at the relevant time that defendant’s conduct was
criminal.