City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), held
that for due process purposes, an ordinance that required
a police officer, upon observing a person whom he
reasonably believed to be a criminal street gang member
loitering in any public place with one or more other
persons, to order all such persons to disperse and remove
themselves from the area, and made failure to obey such
an order promptly a violation, was unconstitutionally
vague in failing to provide fair notice of prohibited
conduct; ordinance failed to distinguish between
innocent loitering and conduct threatening harm, and it
was unclear what was required in order to comply with an
order to disperse from the area. See also Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); City of Mesquite v.
Alladin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982); Allen v.
Bordentown, 216 N.J. Super. 557 (Law Div. 1987).
State, Tp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156
(1999), held vagueness in any regulation creates a denial
of due process because of failure to provide notice and
warning to individual that his or her conduct could
subject that individual to criminal or quasi-criminal
prosecution. See also Binkowski v. State, 322 N.J. Super.
359 (App. Div. 1999).
In State v. Saunders, 302 N.J. Super. 509 (App. Div.
1997), the Appellate Division rejected defendant’s claim
that the stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10, as it stood
prior to its amendment in June 1996 was vague and
overbroad. Any vagueness was mitigated by a scienter
requirement. The statute did not reach a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected conduct and
therefore was not overbroad, especially as applied to a
defendant who repeatedly watched his victim from a
number of different locations. The court noted that the
statute as amended appeared to be clearer regarding the
conduct prohibited.
According to State v. Warriner, 322 N.J. Super. 401
(App. Div. 1999), a criminal statute listing “M1 carbine
type” as an illegal assault weapon was not
unconstitutionally vague on its face; the term “M1
carbine” had an essential meaning, that is, the basic
design of a weapon. The term “type” simply gave notice
that a firearm with that basic design would qualify as an
assault weapon.
State v. Rogers, 308 N.J. Super. 59 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 156 N.J. 385 (1998), held a statute criminalizing
the unauthorized practice of law for a benefit was not
facially vague, since term “practice of law” had been
defined by courts in some contexts, and, therefore,
statute proscribed conduct with sufficient clarity.State v. Marvin J. Friedman, 304 N.J. Super. 1 (App.
Div. 1997), concluded a municipal anti-noise ordinance
was unconstitutionally vague as applied to complaints
alleging that defendant’s dog’s barking awakened their
neighbors on eight occasions.In Guidi v. City of Atlantic City, 286 N.J. Super. 243
(App. Div. 1996), the court found unconstitutional a
municipal ordinance prohibiting “any matter, thing,
condition or act which is or may become an annoyance,
or interfere with the comfort or general well-being of the
inhabitants of this municipality,” as void for vagueness
and overbroad. A citizen had been charged for feeding
birds resulting in heavy accumulation of bird feces on
building roof tops and vehicles on residential streets.In State v. Piemontese, 282 N.J. Super. 307 (App. Div.
1995), the court reversed defendant’s conviction for
violating a municipal ordinance against allowing lawns
hedges and bushes to become “overgrown and
unsightly,” finding the ordinance to be unconstitution-
ally vague and overbroad. The ordinance did not give
reasonable notice to those who wished to avoid its
penalties, nor did it permit the enforcement officer acting
in good faith to be able to point to objective facts that
would lead a reasonable person to realize that his or her
conduct was a violation of the ordinance.State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536 (1994), explained
the constitutional due process limitations on strict
liability criminal statutes apply when underlying
conduct is so passive, so unworthy of blame, that persons
violating proscription would have no notice that they
were breaking the law. Illegal drug distribution did not
fit that categorization and statute imposing strict liability
on manufacturers and distributors of narcotics when a
death resulted was constitutional. See also State v. Kittrell,
145 N.J. 112 (1996).State v. Alexander, 136 N.J. 563 (1994), explained
that the Court’s obligation properly to instruct and guide
jury includes duty to clarify statutory language that
prescribes elements of crime when clarification is
essential to ensure that jury will fully understand and
actually find those elements in determining defendant’s
guilt.State v. Baez, 238 N.J. Super. 93 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 121 N.J. 644 (1990), held that principles of due
process require that penal statutes be strictly construed to