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disclosure of their own grand jury testimony and those of
other potential witnesses for a civil action charging
malicious prosecution and tortuous interference with a
business. Stewart v. Dexter, 218 N.J. Super. 417, 419-21
(Law Div. 1986).


IV. WITNESSES (See also, SELF-INCRIMINA-


TION, GRAND JURY, WITNESSES, this Digest


and the Prosecutors’ Grand Jury Manual)


In State v. Doliner, 96 N.J. at 249-50, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey noted the limited rights of witnesses
in the grand jury context. For example, prosecutors may
subpoena witnesses upon short notice and without first
explaining to them the need for their testimony. See In
re Application of Waterfront Comm’n, 32 N.J. 323, 340
(1960). Prosecutors may conduct investigations without
first establishing the likelihood that any offense has been
committed. See In re Addonizio, 53 N.J. 107, 124-27
(1968). Prosecutors may grant witnesses immunity and
use the court’s contempt power to force compliance with
the immunity order, and they may cause a recalcitrant
witness to be imprisoned for the remainder of the grand
jury’s term. N.J.S.A. 2A:81-17.3. Grand jury witnesses
have no absolute right to be informed of the privilege
against self-incrimination unless he or she is a target, see
State v. Vinegra, 73 N.J. 484, 488 (1977); no right to
counsel in the grand jury room, see Van Horn v. City of
Trenton, 80 N.J. 528, 536 n.2 (1979); no right to remain
silent once immunity is granted, N.J.S.A. 2A:81-17.3;
no right to prior notice of the subject matter under
investigation, and no right to question whether the
prosecutor’s inquiries are relevant to the subject matter of
the investigation, see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1,
13-15 & n.12 (1973); In re Petition to Compel Testimony
of Tuso, 73 N.J. 575, 579 (1977).


A subpoenaed witness must appear and testify before
the grand jury unless he or she has a privilege to not testify
or can show by clear and convincing evidence that
testifying will have an extremely detrimental effect on his
or her mental, physical, or emotional health beyond that
suffered by any witness who is required to testify. Matter
of L.Q., 227 N.J. Super. 41, 49-50 (App. Div. 1988).


After defendant was indicted, he was subpoenaed to
appear before the grand jury and waived immunity. He
was informed that he was a target but not that he had
been indicted. The court held that although such action
was improper, it was not an invasion of the grand jury’s
independence. The improper action merited
suppression of improperly elicited testimony, but not


dismissal of the indictment. State v. Porro, 175 N.J.
Super. 49 (App. Div. 1980).

In Matter of Gail D., 217 N.J. Super. 226, 228-33
(App. Div. 1987), the court declined to adopt a parent-
child privilege barring a suspect’s children and/or father
from testifying before the grand jury about the suspect’s
potential involvement in his wife’s murder. Also, a
witness who is a potential grand jury target has no
constitutional right to refuse to submit handwriting
exemplars pursuant to a grand jury subpoena. In re
Grand Jury Investigation No. 2184-86, 219 N.J. Super.
90, 95 (Law Div. 1987).

In Matter of Nackson, 221 N.J. Super. 187, 207 (App.
Div.), aff’d, 114 N.J. 527 (1989), the court held that the
attorney-client privilege barred the grand jury from
compelling an attorney to answer questions regarding his
client’s location when the grand jury had already
returned an indictment charging the client as a fugitive,
where there were other means of obtaining the needed
information, and where the prosecutor employed the
grand jury as an investigative arm to obtain information
unrelated to the indictment.

V. INDICTMENT (See also, INDICTMENT, this


Digest)


A. Generally

A grand jury may indict for an offense for which a
grand jury of another county has already indicted. A
grand jury may also indict someone for an offense even
though it has previously indicted him or her for a
component part of the offense or even for the same offense
(the superceding indictment). This is so even if the
person has been arrested under the previous indictment,
has pleaded not guilty, and a trial date has been fixed. In
such cases the court may stay one indictment until the
other is tried, consolidate the indictments returned in
one county for trial, compel the prosecutor to elect which
of such indictments he or she will pursue, or take such
other steps as justice requires. However, there is no rule
that the first indictment bars future indictments, or must
be tried first. State v. Josephs, 79 N.J. Super. 411, 414-15
(App. Div. 1963).

In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65,
(1978), the United States Supreme Court held that if a
state prosecutor carries out a threat made during plea
negotiations to reindict the accused on more serious
charges if he or she does not plead guilty to the offense
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