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disclosure of their own grand jury testimony and those of
other potential witnesses for a civil action charging
malicious prosecution and tortuous interference with a
business. Stewart v. Dexter, 218 N.J. Super. 417, 419-21
(Law Div. 1986).

IV. WITNESSES (See also, SELF-INCRIMINA-

TION, GRAND JURY, WITNESSES, this Digest

and the Prosecutors’ Grand Jury Manual)

In State v. Doliner, 96 N.J. at 249-50, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey noted the limited rights of witnesses
in the grand jury context. For example, prosecutors may
subpoena witnesses upon short notice and without first
explaining to them the need for their testimony. See In
re Application of Waterfront Comm’n, 32 N.J. 323, 340
(1960). Prosecutors may conduct investigations without
first establishing the likelihood that any offense has been
committed. See In re Addonizio, 53 N.J. 107, 124-27
(1968). Prosecutors may grant witnesses immunity and
use the court’s contempt power to force compliance with
the immunity order, and they may cause a recalcitrant
witness to be imprisoned for the remainder of the grand
jury’s term. N.J.S.A. 2A:81-17.3. Grand jury witnesses
have no absolute right to be informed of the privilege
against self-incrimination unless he or she is a target, see
State v. Vinegra, 73 N.J. 484, 488 (1977); no right to
counsel in the grand jury room, see Van Horn v. City of
Trenton, 80 N.J. 528, 536 n.2 (1979); no right to remain
silent once immunity is granted, N.J.S.A. 2A:81-17.3;
no right to prior notice of the subject matter under
investigation, and no right to question whether the
prosecutor’s inquiries are relevant to the subject matter of
the investigation, see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1,
13-15 & n.12 (1973); In re Petition to Compel Testimony
of Tuso, 73 N.J. 575, 579 (1977).

A subpoenaed witness must appear and testify before
the grand jury unless he or she has a privilege to not testify
or can show by clear and convincing evidence that
testifying will have an extremely detrimental effect on his
or her mental, physical, or emotional health beyond that
suffered by any witness who is required to testify. Matter
of L.Q., 227 N.J. Super. 41, 49-50 (App. Div. 1988).

After defendant was indicted, he was subpoenaed to
appear before the grand jury and waived immunity. He
was informed that he was a target but not that he had
been indicted. The court held that although such action
was improper, it was not an invasion of the grand jury’s
independence. The improper action merited
suppression of improperly elicited testimony, but not

dismissal of the indictment. State v. Porro, 175 N.J.

Super. 49 (App. Div. 1980).

In Matter of Gail D., 217 N.J. Super. 226, 228-33

(App. Div. 1987), the court declined to adopt a parent-

child privilege barring a suspect’s children and/or father

from testifying before the grand jury about the suspect’s

potential involvement in his wife’s murder. Also, a

witness who is a potential grand jury target has no

constitutional right to refuse to submit handwriting

exemplars pursuant to a grand jury subpoena. In re

Grand Jury Investigation No. 2184-86, 219 N.J. Super.

90, 95 (Law Div. 1987).

In Matter of Nackson, 221 N.J. Super. 187, 207 (App.

Div.), aff’d, 114 N.J. 527 (1989), the court held that the

attorney-client privilege barred the grand jury from

compelling an attorney to answer questions regarding his

client’s location when the grand jury had already

returned an indictment charging the client as a fugitive,

where there were other means of obtaining the needed

information, and where the prosecutor employed the

grand jury as an investigative arm to obtain information

unrelated to the indictment.

V. INDICTMENT (See also, INDICTMENT, this

Digest)

A. Generally

A grand jury may indict for an offense for which a

grand jury of another county has already indicted. A

grand jury may also indict someone for an offense even

though it has previously indicted him or her for a

component part of the offense or even for the same offense

(the superceding indictment). This is so even if the

person has been arrested under the previous indictment,

has pleaded not guilty, and a trial date has been fixed. In

such cases the court may stay one indictment until the

other is tried, consolidate the indictments returned in

one county for trial, compel the prosecutor to elect which

of such indictments he or she will pursue, or take such

other steps as justice requires. However, there is no rule

that the first indictment bars future indictments, or must

be tried first. State v. Josephs, 79 N.J. Super. 411, 414-15

(App. Div. 1963).

In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65,

(1978), the United States Supreme Court held that if a

state prosecutor carries out a threat made during plea

negotiations to reindict the accused on more serious

charges if he or she does not plead guilty to the offense