“tests” to determine if the petitioner had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the Fourth Amendment claim.
Id. at 1270-72. The Willett court adopted the test of
Capellan v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67, to decide that a Fourth
Amendment claim may be reviewed in habeas “‘if the
state has provided no corrective procedures at all to
redress the alleged fourth amendment violations’” or “if
the state has provided a corrective mechanism, but the
defendant was precluded from using that mechanism
because of an unconscionable breakdown in the
underlying process.” Id. at 1271-72.
XII. STATE LAW CLAIMS
“State prisoners are entitled to relief on writ of habeas
corpus in federal court only upon showing a violation of
federal constitutional standards.” Todaro v. Fulcomer,
944 F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 909, 112 S.Ct. 1271, 117 L.Ed.2d 498 (1992); 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (writ shall not extend to a prisoner
unless the prisoner is in custody “in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States....”);
28 U.S.C. § (2254(a) (application for a writ of habeas
corpus entertained only on ground that petitioner is in
custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.”). Accord, Smith v. Phillips,
455 U.S. 209, 221, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78
(1982); Smith v. Zimmerman, 768 F.2d 69, 71 (3d Cir.
1985). It is clear, however, “that ‘federal habeas corpus
relief does not lie for errors of state law.’” Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d
385 (1991) (quoting from Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764,
780, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990)). “[I]t is
not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine
state-court determinations on state-law questions. In
conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to
deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. at 68. Thus, “a state court’s misapplication of
its own law does not generally raise a constitutional claim.
The federal courts have no supervisory authority over
state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to
correct wrongs of constitutional dimension.” Johnson v.
Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting
from Geschwendt v. Ryan, 967 F.2d 877, 888-89 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977, 113 S.Ct. 472, 121
L.Ed.2d 379 (1992)); Kontakis v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 110,
117 & n.12 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 881, 115
S.Ct. 215, 130 L.Ed.2d 143 (1994).
Infirmities in a state post-conviction procedure are
not cognizable claims in a habeas corpus proceeding,
because a petitioner’s claim as to errors or defects in the
state post-conviction relief proceeding is not an attack on
the actual detention. Williams v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 140,
143 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 990, 101 S.Ct.
2328, 68 L.Ed.2d 849 (1981); Trevino v. Johnson, 168
F.3d 173, 180 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1056,
120 S.Ct. 22, 144 L.Ed.2d 825 (1999); Gee v. Groose,
110 F.3d 1346, 1351 (8th Cir. 1997); Bryant v.
Maryland, 848 F.2d 492, 493 (4th Cir. 1988); Kirby v.
Dutton, 794 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1986); Mason v. Meyers,
208 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2000) (four-year delay in
processing of state collateral relief claim not cognizable in
a federal habeas proceeding; Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160
F.3d 941 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1065,
119 S.Ct. 1456, 143 L.Ed.2d 542 (1999) (same); Heiser
v. Ryan, 15 F.3d 299 (3d Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Heiser
v. Stepanik, 513 U.S. 926, 115 S.Ct. 313, 130 L.Ed.2d
276 (1994) (same). But see Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d
150 (1st Cir. 1984) (rejecting Williams rationale).A claim that a jury instruction was allegedly incorrect
under state law is not a basis for habeas relief unless “‘the
ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that
the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. at 71-72.A claim regarding the denial of a motion for a new
trial is generally one of state law, unless the petitioner
demonstrates the “denial of fundamental fairness or a
violation of a specific constitutional right.” United States
ex rel. Guillen v. De Robertis, 580 F. Supp. 1551, 1556
(N.D. Ill. 1984).Claims of actual innocence based on allegedly newly
discovered evidence do not constitute grounds for federal
habeas relief absent an independent constitutional
violation occurring in the state criminal proceedings.
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 113 S.Ct. 853,
122 L. Ed.2d 203 (1993).“[T]he existence merely of newly discovered evidence
relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for
relief on federal habeas corpus.” Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 317 (1963); Hill v. Lockhart, 927 F.2d 340,
345 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 927, 112 S.Ct. 344,
116 L.Ed.2d 283 (1991); DeMartino v. Weidenburner,
616 F.2d 708, 711 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Swindle v.
Davis, 846 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1988) (“newly
discovered” evidence in form of testimony that victim was
actually killed by another individual in second
altercation subsequent to the petitioner’s altercation
with victim clearly goes to the question of Swindle’s guilt
or innocence” and “does not establish a ground for habeas
relief”); Fell v. Rafferty, 736 F. Supp. 623 (D.N.J. 1990)