HINDERINGHINDERINGHINDERINGHINDERINGHINDERING
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3 bifurcates the crime of hindering
into two sections. Section a outlaws the hindering of the
detention, apprehension, investigation, prosecution,
conviction or punishment of another. Section b of
N.J.S.A. 29-3 covers defendants who hinder their own
detention, apprehension, investigation, prosecution,
conviction or punishment.
The two sections differ in that the purpose element
in each is different. Thus, if a person is to be charged with
hindering both one’s own and another’s prosecutions,
the two charges must be in separate counts and charged
separately to the jury. State v. Krieger, 285 N.J. Super.
146, 151-153 (App. Div. 1995).
In Krieger, the Appellate Division found that the
crime of hindering the prosecution of another by witness
tampering as set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3a is a different
crime with different elements from hindering the
prosecution of one’s self by witness tampering as defined
by N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b. In this case the two crimes were
improperly joined in a single count of the indictment and
the jury was improperly permitted to rest a finding of
guilt on one or the other. Additionally, there was no
instruction to the jury and no proof of one of the elements
of witness tampering under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b.
In State v. Henry, 323 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div.
1999), the Appellate Division set aside defendant’s
hindering apprehension conviction because the charge to
which he pled guilty, i.e., concealing evidence of the
crime, “specifically himself,” did not set forth an offense.
Hindering apprehension does not occur when defendant
refuses to submit to arrest or avoids compliance with the
law.
Similarly, a defendant who gave a false name in
response to a law enforcement officer’s inquiry did not
“volunteer false information” to law enforcement officer
within the meaning of the statute prohibiting
volunteering false information to law enforcement officer
to hinder one’s own apprehension, prosecution,
conviction or punishment. State v. Valetin, 105 N.J. 14
(1987).
Likewise, the hindering statute is applicable only to
completed criminal acts, not to ongoing possessory
crimes where possession of items or substance at that time
was chargeable as separate offense. State v. Fuqua, 303
N.J. Super. 40 (App. Div. 1997).
In State v. Casimono, 250 N.J.Super. 173 (App. Div.
1991), the court found that even though state troopers
violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by
subjecting him to a pat-down search for weapons, the
troopers’ conduct did not bar defendant’s convictions for
hindering apprehension and resisting arrest. The
decisive factor supporting the admission of evidence of
defendant’s resisting arrest and hindering apprehension
was the intervening circumstance of defendant’s
voluntary commission subsequent to illegal police
conduct of new criminal offenses with high potential for
causing injury to law enforcement officers.In State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330 (1989), defendant’s
conviction for hindering apprehension or prosecution of
another was supported by evidence that, after the killing,
defendant and the other person returned to the other
person’s apartment, removed their blood-stained
clothes, changed into other person’s clothes, and threw
their clothes and the murder weapons into trash bags.In State v. McDougald, 120 N.J. 523 (1990), a
hindering conviction was supported by testimony
regarding defendant’s statements that victims pressed
criminal charges against him and that defendant
repeatedly asked one of the victims why they were trying
to hurt him.The crime of hindering apprehension was not a
lesser-included offense of robbery, although robbery
charge arose when defendant drove his companions from
scene of robbery. State v. Williams, 232 N.J. Super. 432
(1989).Consecutive sentences for hindering apprehension
and attempted unlawful disposition of a handgun were
legal, where offenses were distinct crimes, committed at
different times and places. State v. Smith, 322 N.J. Super.
385 (App. Div. 1999), State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128
(1991)(trial court validly made sentences for hindering
and possession of drugs consecutive on noncapital counts
of capital murder case; court had found as aggravating
factors need for deterrence and prevention of recidivism);
but see State v. Childs, 204 N.J. Super. 639, 641-42 (App.
Div. 1985), aff’d on other grounds, 208 N.J. Super. 61
(App. Div.), certif. denied 104 N.J. 430 (1986)(hinder-
ing conviction treated as a lesser included offense to
armed robbery).