vehicle under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life. The relevant “circumstances”
are those which occurred at a time immediately
preceding the homicides, such as the operation of the
vehicle at a high rate of speed, the failure to observe stop
signs and traffic signals, turning out the vehicle’s
headlights, and the consumption of alcohol. Thus
evidence of the defendant’s lack of remorse for the deaths,
and his callousness and lack of sympathy for the injuries
sustained by his wife and friends, who were passengers in
his vehicle, were not relevant circumstances of his reckless
operation of his vehicle under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to human life. State v. Pindale, 249
N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 1991). But where a defendant
immediately fled the scene of the accident without
offering any aid, that fact was evidence that he acted with
extreme indifference to human life. State v. Radziwill,
235 N.J. Super. 557, 570 (App. Div. 1989), aff’d o.b.,
121 N.J. 527 (1990).
Where the defendant drank to the point of being
severely intoxicated, drove his truck on a main
thoroughfare at an excessive rate of speed, and proceeded
into an intersection on a red traffic light, both the
decision to drive and the manner in which the defendant
drove indicated a complete disregard for the lives of others
to justify indictment and conviction for aggravated
manslaughter. State v. Bogus, 223 N.J. Super. 409, 418-
19 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 567 (1988).
Because nothing short of a purposeful state of mind
can constitute a criminal attempt, the concepts of
attempted aggravated manslaughter and attempted
manslaughter are self-contradictory. One cannot
attempt/intend to cause an unintended result. State v.
Robinson, 266 N.J. Super. 268, 276-77 (App. Div.
1993), rev’d on other grounds, 136 N.J. 476 (1994).
Attempted passion/provocation manslaughter, how-
ever, is cognizable under the Code as a lesser-included
offense of attempted murder. Attempted passion/
provocation manslaughter would be attempted murder
except that it was committed in the heat of passion or as
a result of provocation. State v. Robinson, 136 N.J. at 486-
88.
“Passion/provocation manslaughter is an intentional
homicide committed under extenuating circumstances
that mitigate the murder.” State v. Robinson, 136 N.J.
476, 481 (1994). It is “a concession to the frailty of man,
a recognition that the average person can understandably
react violently to a sufficient wrong and hence some lesser
punishment is appropriate.” State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J.
402, 410 (1990); State v. Crisantos (Arriagas), 102 N.J.
265, 274 (1986). Passion/provocation manslaughter
consists of four elements: (1) the provocation must be
adequate to inflame a reasonable person; (2) the
defendant must not have had time to cool off between the
provocation and the homicide; (3) the provocation must
have actually impassioned the defendant; (4) and the
defendant must not have actually cooled off. State v.
Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 411. The first two elements are
objective; the second two are subjective and are usually
determined by the jury. Id. at 411-13.Aggravated manslaughter is not reduced to
manslaughter when it is committed in the heat of passion
resulting from reasonable provocation. State v. Grunow,
102 N.J. 133 (1986). Nor can felony murder, a strict
liability crime, be mitigated to manslaughter by proof of
provocation. State v. Crisantos (Arriagas), 102 N.J. 265,
271-72 n.7 (1986).Passion/provocation may mitigate an otherwise
purposeful or knowing murder where the homicidal act
is a response to a provocation sufficient “to inflame the
passions of a reasonable person” so that the defendant’s
loss of control is a “reasonable reaction.” State v. Mauricio,
117 N.J. 402, 410 (1990). As a result, a defendant who
has a personality disorder which made him more easily
provoked was not entitled to a charge on passion/
provocation manslaughter where the claimed provoca-
tion would not have “inflamed the passions of a
reasonable person.” State v. Abrams, 256 N.J. Super. 390,
397-98 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 395 (1992).
In this same vein, the diminished ability of children to
exercise reasonable self-control cannot be considered in
determining whether a criminal homicide was
committed in the heat of passion resulting for a
reasonable provocation. A juvenile defendant is held to
an adult standard of self-control. State v. Pratt, 226 N.J.
Super. 307 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 314
(1988). But testimony that the defendant suffered from
post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the victim’s
past course of sexual assaults of her was relevant to the
question of whether the victim’s conduct “actually
impassioned” the defendant. State v. Hines, 303 N.J.
Super. 311 (App. Div. 1997).Mutual combat, when waged on equal terms and
where no unfair advantage is taken of the victim, may
reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter. The
offense is murder, however, and not manslaughter, where
the accused alone is armed and takes unfair advantage of
the victim. State v. Crisantos (Arriagas), 102 N.J. 265
(1986); State v. Copling, 326 N.J. Super. 417 (App. Div.