1999), certif. denied, 164 N.J. 189 (2000). For mutual
combat to constitute adequate provocation, the
retaliation must be proportionate to the provocation. If
the defendant, on slight provocation, attacks the victim
with violence out of proportion to the provocation, the
crime is murder. Thus, a single blow struck by an
unarmed woman did not constitute objectively
reasonable provocation to mitigate from murder to
manslaughter the defendant’s conduct in hacking and
stabbing the victim fifty times with three knives. State v.
Oglesby, 122 N.J. 522 (1991).
If the defendant himself creates the situation that
causes his own passion or provocation, he should not
benefit from it and is not entitled to a charge on passion/
provocation manslaughter. State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525,
571-73 (1995). Thus, the passion of a defendant,
aroused as a result of injuries inflicted by his victim in
justifiable self-defense, is, as a matter of law, insufficient
to mitigate the defendant’s culpability for the resulting
homicide. State v. Pasternick, 285 N.J. Super. 607, 615-
17 (App. Div. 1995).
Battery, except for a light blow, is traditionally
considered. “almost as a matter of law,” to be objectively
adequate provocation. State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402,
414 (1990). In contrast, words alone, no matter how
offensive or insulting, do not constitute adequate
provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. State v.
Crisantos (Arriagas), 102 N.J. 265, 274 (1986); State v.
Bonano, 59 N.J. 515, 524 (1971). But verbal threats
accompanied by a past history of violence and
threatening gestures can provide a basis for a passion/
provocation manslaughter instruction, State v. Vigilante,
257 N.J. Super. 296 (App. Div. 1992), just as a threat
with a gun or a knife can constitute adequate provocation.
State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. at 414.
A course of ill-treatment or abuse of the accused or
someone with whom the accused has a close relationship,
sufficient to prompt a homicidal response in a reasonable
person, and which the accused reasonably believes is
likely to continue, can be objectively reasonable
provocation to warrant a charge on passion/provocation
manslaughter. State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 225-28
(1990); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (1984); State v. Guido,
40 N.J. 191, 209-11 (1963). Where the victim wanted
to date other men and the defendant suspected her of
“messing around,” that did not constitute a course of ill-
treatment which could have provoked a homicidal
response in an ordinary person, especially since the
defendant himself was involved in a sexual relationship
with another woman. State v. Darrian, 255 N.J. Super.
435, 451 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 13 (1992).Conduct which causes injury to a relative and renders
the defendant “out-of-control” can constitute provoca-
tion to warrant a charge on passion/provocation
manslaughter. State v. Bishop, 225 N.J. Super. 596 (App.
Div. 1988). But where the defendant learned the next
day that his brother had been attacked but was not
injured, that was not objectively reasonable provocation
to reduce the murder to manslaughter. State v. Copling,
326 N.J. Super. 417, 430 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied,
164 N.J. 189 (2000).Resisting the accused’s sexual advances does not
constitute provocation sufficient to reduce murder to
manslaughter. State v. Hollander, 201 N.J. Super. 453,
474-75 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 335 (1985).
Nor does the victim’s alleged inconsistent behavior of
seeing the defendant freely on some occasions while
enforcing the restraining orders against him on others.
State v. Cardona, 268 N.J. Super. 38, 46-47 (App. Div.
1993), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 300 (1994).A defendant was not entitled to an instruction on
passion/provocation manslaughter where the claimed
provocation of seeing his girlfriend in bed with another
man occurred more than twenty-four hours earlier. The
“heat of passion” defense presupposes that the defendant
acted on a great provocation “before a time sufficient to
permit reason to resume its sway had passed.” State v.
Lassiter, 197 N.J. Super. 2 (App. Div. 1984). Moreover,
the trend is away from deeming infidelity to be a
“reasonable provocation” for murder. See Kontakis v.
Beyer, 19 F.3d 110, 113 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
881, 115 S.Ct. 215, 130 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1994) (noting
that states “may prefer the more civilized approach of
leaving the settlement of these disputes to the
matrimonial courts”).A reasonable person would cool-off in two and one
half hours after discovering that his brother was attacked,
but not injured, the prior day. State v. Copling, 326 N.J.
Super. 417 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 164 N.J. 189
(2000). The defendant’s involvement, however, in two
violent physical confrontations with a bouncer less than
one-half hour before he shot the victim in the mistaken
belief that he was the bouncer entitled the defendant to
a charge on passion/provocation manslaughter. State v.
Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402 (1990)Although passion/provocation does not reduce
aggravated manslaughter to manslaughter, an otherwise