even though the coconspirator has an immunity to
prosecution for the crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:5-3a(2).
IX. JUVENILES
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-29 provides that no testimony of a
juvenile at a waiver hearing shall be admissible for any
purpose in any hearing to determine delinquency or guilt
of any offense. A family part decision, State v. Y.B., 264
N.J. Super. 423 (Ch. Div. 1993), ruled that the provision
of the juvenile waiver statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26, placing
on the juvenile the burden of proving the probability that
he can be rehabilitated by age 19 unconstitutionally
conflicted with the juvenile’s right against compelled
self-incrimination. The Appellate Division rejected Y.B.
in In re A.L., 271 N.J. Super. 192 (App. Div. 1994). Any
Fifth Amendment concerns in the juvenile-waiver statute
are removed by the N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-29 grant of
immunity. 271 N.J. Super. at 207-08. To save its
constitutionality the Appellate Division read the statute
as conferring derivative-use immunity as well as use
immunity. Id. at 211-13.
INCOMPETENCY TOINCOMPETENCY TOINCOMPETENCY TOINCOMPETENCY TOINCOMPETENCY TO
STAND TRIALSTAND TRIALSTAND TRIALSTAND TRIALSTAND TRIAL
(See also, INSANITY, WITNESSES, this Digest)
I. MENTAL INCOMPETENCE EXCLUDING
THE FITNESS TO PROCEED (N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4)
A defendant who lacks the capacity to understand the
proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense
may not be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the
commission of an offense so long as the incapacity
endures. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4a; Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903 (1975); State v. Spivey, 65
N.J. 21, 36 (1974); See also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S.
389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2685 (1993). To bring a
legally incompetent defendant to trial would violate due
process. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354, 116
S.Ct. 1373, 1376 (1996); Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 439, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2574 (1992); Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. at 171-72; State v. Lambert, 275 N.J.
Super. 125, 128 (App. Div. 1994); State v. Cecil, 260 N.J.
Super. 475, 480 (App. Div. 1992), certif. denied, 133 N.J.
431 (1993).
The capacity to stand trial relates to a defendant’s
present ability, i.e., at the time of trial, to stand trial. See
State v. Otero, 238 N.J. Super. 649, 655 (Law Div. 1989)
(court-ordered medication, if administered in a
medically accepted manner, may be utilized to achieve
sufficient competency); see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504
U.S. 127, 133-36, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 1814-15 (1992) (a
state may be able to justify medically appropriate,
involuntary treatment of medication by establishing that
it could not obtain an adjudication of the defendant’s
guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means).
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b, a person is considered
mentally competent to stand trial on criminal charges if
the proofs establish the following:
- That the defendant has the mental capacity to
appreciate his presence in relation to time, place, and
things; and - That the defendant’s elementary mental processes
are such that he understands that:
a. He is in a court charged with a criminal offense;
b. There is a judge on the bench;