c. There is a prosecutor who will try to convict him;d. He has a lawyer who will defend him;e. He would be expected to tell, to the best of his
ability, the facts surrounding him at the time and place
where the alleged violation was committed if he decided
to testify, but also understands that he has a right not to
testify;
f. There is or may be a jury present to consider
evidence as to his guilt or innocence of the charge or, if he
chooses to enter into plea negotiations or plead guilty,
that he understand the consequences of a guilty plea, and
that he be able to waive those rights knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily upon entry of a guilty plea;
and
g. He has the ability to participate in his defense.
N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b; State v. Lambert, 275 N.J. Super. at
130; State v. Cecil, 260 N.J. Super. at 485.
Thus, the inquiry on the incompetency question
remains simply whether or not the defendant
understands his position and can assist counsel in his own
defense. See State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 549 (1967);
State v. Caralluzzo, 49 N.J. 152, 155 (1967); State v.
Snell, 136 N.J. Super. 506, 508-509 (App. Div. 1975),
certif. denied, 69 N.J. 387 (1976); State v. Latif, 134 N.J.
Super. 441, 446 (App. Div. 1975); State v. Pugh, 117
N.J. Super. 26, 30 (App. Div. 1971), certif. denied, 60
N.J. 22 (1972); see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. at
354; Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct.
788, 788-89 (1960). In State v. Moya, 329 N.J. Super.
499, 507 (App. Div. 2000), the court stated: “More
should not be expected of a concedely mildly retarded
defendant than we expect of jurors unless the individual
has demonstrated, following simple instruction no less
comprehensive than those given to prospective jurors, an
inability to process or comprehend enough of the
information to meet N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b(2) standards.”
A trial court is required to be “alert” to circumstances
which would suggest a change that would render the
defendant incompetent to stand trial. State v. Lambert,
275 N.J. Super. at 129 (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
at 181). However, it is also expected that defense counsel,
who is in a far better position than the trial judge to assay
the facts concerning the defendant’s fitness to stand trial
and assist in his own defense, would make the initial
request for a hearing on the issue. State v. Lambert, 275
N.J. Super. at 129 (citing State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 74
(1959)); see also State v. Ehrenberg, 284 N.J. Super. 309,
314-15 (Law Div. 1994) (the importance of the role of
counsel is to alert the court of the possibility that the
defendant is incompetent has long been recognized); cf.
State v. Cecil, 260 N.J. Super. at 481 (a lawyer’s
representations concerning the competence of the
defendant is a factor to be considered, however, the court
does not need to accept that representation without
question) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. at 177, n.
13).The standards for determining a defendant’s
competency to stand trial are different from the criteria
employed in determining criminal responsibility for an
alleged criminal offense. State v. Otero, 238 N.J. Super. at- Thus, one may suffer from mental illness, but
nevertheless, be competent to stand trial. Id.; see also State
v. Cecil, 260 N.J. Super. at 485 (evidence that a defendant
may be suffering from a mental illness does not
necessarily raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s
competence to stand trial); State v. Badger, 229 N.J.
Super. 288, 293 (Law Div. 1988) (defendant suffering
from a multiple-personality disorder was competent to
stand trial).
Accordingly, the inquiry regarding the capacity to
stand trial is distinct from the insanity defense. See State
v. Spivey, 65 N.J. at 39; Aponte v. State, 30 N.J. 441, 450
(1959); see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. at 448. In
fact, an insane defendant may be capable of standing trial.
State v. Spivey, 65 N.J. at 39. In Cecil, the trial court was
not required to hold a competency hearing to determine
whether the defendant was fit to stand trial, even though
there was evidence that the defendant suffered from a
mental illness, and thus, the defendant was sufficiently
competent to waive the defense of insanity and
diminished capacity. 260 N.J. Super. at 485-90; see also
State v. Khan, 175 N.J. Super. 72, 82-83 (App. Div.
1980) (inquiry into a defendant’s decision to waive
insanity defense must focus on defendant’s awareness of
his right and available alternatives, comprehension of the
consequences of failing to assert the defense and
voluntariness of the decision to waive it).A defendant who lacks the capacity to stand trial also
lacks the capacity to enter a guilty plea. State v. Norton,
167 N.J. Super. 229, 231 (App. Div. 1979). In Godinez
v. Moran, 509 U.S. at 391, the United States Supreme
Court held that the competency standard for pleading
guilty or waiving the right to counsel is the same as the
competency standard for standing trial, i.e., “whether the
defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational