U.S. 945 (1973). The Court in McCray differentiated
cases like Roviaro where guilt or innocense was at stake
and cases like McCray where probable cause was at issue.
In McCray, the Court wrote “[w]e have repeatedly made
clear that federal officers need not disclose an informer’s
identity in applying for an arrest or search warrant.” Id.
at 311, 87 S.Ct. at 1062. The McCray Court would seem
to warrant disclosure in instances where the trial judge
deemed it necessary to assess credibility or accuracy. The
responsibility for striking the proper balance lies within
the sound discretion of the trial judge.
III. INFORMERS AND THE DETERMINA-
TION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Where an affidavit relies on an informant’s tip, the
probable cause determination requires an examination of
the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983). The
standard was adopted under the New Jersey Constitution
in State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 (1987). The
informant’s “veracity,” “reliability” and “basis of
knowledge” are all highly relevant. Gates, 472 U.S. at
230, 103 S.Ct. at 2328. Independent corroboration is
necessary to ratify the informant’s veracity and validate
the truthfulness of the tip. State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83,
95 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1033 (1998); State v.
Zutic, 155 N.J. 103 (1998).
INSANITYINSANITYINSANITYINSANITYINSANITY
(See also, INCOMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL,
INTOXICATION, PRESUMPTIONS AND
INFERENCES, this Digest)
N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1 continues this State’s adherence to
the M’Naghten test for determining when a defendant
should be acquitted by reason of insanity. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-
1 provides:A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the
time of such conduct he was laboring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did
know it, that he did not know what he was doing was
wrong.This “right and wrong” test excuses a defendant from
criminal liability, if at the time the defendant commits
the offense, the defendant lacked the capacity to
distinguish right from wrong; it also focuses on the
defendant’s ability to perceive the wrongfulness of his
conduct, and not on the actual knowledge of the
defendant. State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 610 (1990).
Under this test, the defendant need not be insane at the
time of trial; temporary insanity at the time the criminal
offense occurred may justify an acquittal. See State v.
Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 218-19 (1972).I. RAISING THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A defendant who intends to raise the insanity defense
must serve timely notice on the State. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-3a;
R. 3:12. Otherwise, the defendant may be barred from
presenting evidence in support of the defense at trial.
State v. Burnett, 198 N.J. Super. 53, 57-62 (App. Div.
1984), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 269 (1985).Even if a defendant fails to properly raise the insanity
defense or refuses to rely on the defense, the court may sua
sponte interpose the insanity defense on a defendant’s
behalf, if the defendant is not capable of making a
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the defense.
See State v. Khan, 175 N.J. Super. 72, 82-84 (App. Div.
1980); See also State v. Ehrenberg, 284 N.J. Super. 309,
316 (Law Div. 1994) (where facts and attendant
circumstances suggest that an insanity or diminished
capacity defense is possible, the trial court must
determine that the defendant is aware of the defense, and
that the defendant has made a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver of the defense; the inquiry should be in
terms of the defendant’s awareness of his rights and