Super. at 720-25 (because the defendant gave notice of an
insanity defense and adduced evidence relevant to his
ability to form the requisite mental state, the trial court
should have sua sponte charged the jury as to diminished
capacity even as it applied to an offense with a reckless
mental element such as aggravated manslaughter).
C. Sufficiency of Evidence
If there is reasonable doubt as to whether a
defendant’s mental condition permitted him to form the
requisite knowledge or purpose which constitutes an
essential element of the crime, the defendant is entitled
to an acquittal. State v. Nataluk, 316 N.J. Super. at 343.
In State v. Sexton, 311 N.J. Super. 70, 88 (App. Div.),
aff’d, 160 N.J. 93 (1998), it was held that evidence that
the defendant was a special education student with
limited mental ability was relevant to the issue of whether
the defendant had the requisite reckless mental state. See
also State v. Kotter, 271 N.J. Super. at 221-22 (diminished
capacity is applicable in cases involving reckless conduct).
In State v. Washington, 223 N.J. Super. 367, 375-76
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 612 (1988), evidence
that the defendant suffered from a diminished capacity
was relevant in determining whether it was appropriate to
charge manslaughter as a lesser included offense;
although the defendant’s diminished capacity may have
prevented him from acting purposely, he may have
retained an awareness and control over his actions to have
acted recklessly.
VI. PROCEEDINGS NECESSARY UPON AN
ACQUITTAL BY REASON OF INSANITY
A. Commitment of a Person by Reason of Insanity
(N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8)
N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8a provides that after a defendant has
been acquitted by reason of insanity, the court must order
a psychiatric examination of the defendant by a
psychiatrist of the prosecutor’s choice. If the examination
cannot take place because of the unwillingness of the
defendant to participate, the court must proceed as
provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5c. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8a. The
defendant may also be examined by a psychiatrist of his
own choice. Id.
The disposition of the defendant shall be made by
the court in the following manner:
- If the court finds that the defendant may be
released without danger to the community or himself
without supervision, the court must release the
defendant; or- If the court finds that the defendant may be
released without danger to the community or himself
under supervision or under conditions, the court must so
order; or - If the court finds that the defendant cannot be
released with or without supervision or conditions
without posing a danger to the community or to himself,
the court must commit the defendant to a mental health
facility, and is to be treated as a person civilly committed.
N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8b; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 363, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2083 (1997) (the state may
take measures to restrict the freedom of the dangerously
mentally ill, which is an historic and legitimate non-
punitive government objective).
If a defendant is committed to a mental health facility
by reason of insanity or pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6 (i.e.,
a defendant who lacks the fitness to proceed), the
prosecuting attorney maintains the right to appear and
be heard at all proceedings, including any periodic review
hearing. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8b(3); see In the Matter of the
Commitment of Calu, 301 N.J. Super. 20, 31 (App. Div.
1997).The State has the burden to prove the need for a
defendant’s continued commitment under the law
governing civil commitment, which shall be established
by a preponderance of the evidence during the maximum
period of imprisonment that could have been imposed, as
an ordinary term of imprisonment, for any charge on
which the defendant has been acquitted by reason of
insanity. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8b(3); In re Commitment of
W.K., 159 N.J. 1, 4 (1999); see also In the Matter of
Commitment of Edward S., 118 N.J. 118, 130, n. 4
(1990). Expiration of the maximum period of
imprisonment is to be calculated by crediting the
defendant with any time spent in confinement for the
charge(s) on which the defendant has been acquitted by
reason of insanity. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8b(3); see also In re
Commitment of W.K., 159 N.J. at 6 (in cases involving
multiple offenses, a defendant may remain under
commitment for the maximum ordinary aggregate terms
that he would have received if convicted of the offenses
charged, taking into account the usual principles of
sentencing, e.g., merger). Moreover, a person committed
by reason of insanity may not be confined in a penal or
correctional institution. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8.