The Appellate Division, in reversing the trial court, noted
that it was clear that an appropriate analysis for
determining whether the indictment was properly
dismissed under Article III involves a two-part test. First,
if the fault lies with one of the jurisdictions involved, then
substantial compliance by defendant with Article III
requirements is sufficient. Second, even if substantial
compliance is acceptable, it must still be determined
whether defendant’s actions reach such a level. Letters
addressed to a Deputy Attorney General of New Jersey
and a habeas petition, in which defendant specifically
eschewed any intent to resort to I.A.D. remedies, could
not be construed as a request by defendant under the
I.A.D. for final disposition of his case, nor did either the
letters or habeas petition constitute substantial
compliance with the procedural requirements of Article
III. Moreover, with regard to Articles IV and V of the
I.A.D., the State made reasonable efforts to obtain
custody of defendant, which efforts were frustrated by
defendant’s actions, and thus the State did not violate the
time constraints imposed by those articles.
In any event, habeas corpus will not lie for an alleged
violation of the 180 day period set forth in Article III
where trial is held less than a month after the expiration
of that time period since such relief, if granted, would
trivialize the writ. Casper v. Ryan, 822 F.2d 1283 (3 Cir.
1987).
B. Procedural Rights
The Detainer Agreement does not eliminate a
prisoner’s rights provided by the Uniform Extradition
Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:160-1 et seq. A prisoner may be
transferred under Article IV of the Detainer Act only after
being afforded an opportunity for a hearing as provided
in the Extradition Act. Adams v. Cuyler, 592 F.2d (3d
Cir. 1979), aff’d sub nom. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433
(1981).
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978), in
which the Supreme Court held that a writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum issued by a federal district court
is not a “detainer” for purposes of the IADA although,
when preceded by a proper detainer, the writ can serve as
a “written request for temporary custody” which, if
honored, will trigger the speedy trial and anti-shuttling
provisions of the IADA, does not apply retroactively
under the newly announced rule of Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708 (1987), since, unlike
Griffith, a violation of the IAD is not an infringement of
a constitutional right. Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439 (3
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 979, 108 S.Ct 1277
(1988).
INTOXICATIONINTOXICATIONINTOXICATIONINTOXICATIONINTOXICATION
I. AS A DEFENSE TO CRIME
Intoxication of the actor is not a defense unless it
negatives an element of the offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8a;
State v. Cameron, 104 N.J. 42, 51 (1986).To satisfy the statutory requirement to negative an
element of the offense, intoxication must be of such a
degree that it causes “prostration of the faculties” to
render the actor incapable of forming the requisite intent
to commit the crime. State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402,
418-19 (1990); State v. Cameron, 104 N.J. 42, 54
(1986). The factors to consider to determine if
intoxication was sufficient for prostration of the faculties
include the quantity of intoxicant consumed, the period
of time involved, the actor’s conduct as perceived by
others, the odor of alcohol or other intoxicating
substances, the results of any tests to determine
intoxication and its level, and the actor’s ability to recall
significant events. State v. Cameron, 104 N.J. at 54.There is no legal distinction between intoxication
induced by drugs or by alcohol. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8e(1);
State v. Sette, 259 N.J. Super. 156, 173-74 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 130 N.J. 597 (1992).The involuntary intoxication defense has no
application to the motor vehicle violation of driving while
intoxicated because the charge of drunk driving arises
under the Motor Vehicle Act and not the Code of
Criminal Justice. Moreover, driving while intoxicated is
a strict liability offense and intoxication can only be a
defense where voluntary conduct is an element of the
offense. State v. Hammond, 118 N.J. 306 (1990).Pursuant to R. 3:12, a defendant who intends to
claim the defense of intoxication must serve written
notice on the prosecutor no later than seven days before
the arraignment/status conference and, if defendant
requests or has received discovery, shall furnish the
prosecutor with discovery pertaining to the defense at
that time.A. Voluntary Intoxication“Self-induced” or “voluntary” intoxication is
intoxication caused by substances which the actor
knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of
which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know,
unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or