under such circumstances as would afford a defense to a
charge of crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8e(2).
Self-induced or voluntary intoxication may be a
defense only to crimes requiring either purposeful or
knowing mental states. When the requisite culpability is
purposeful or knowing, evidence of intoxication is
admissible to disprove the requisite mental state. State v.
Cameron, 104 N.J. 42, 52-53 (1986).
Voluntary intoxication can reduce murder to
aggravated manslaughter or manslaughter. State v.
Mauricio, 117 N.J. 401, 418 (1990); State v. Warren,
104 N.J. 571, 577 (1986).
Self-induced or voluntary intoxication is not a
defense to crimes predicated on any degree of recklessness
or negligence. State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 144-45 (1988);
State v. Warren, 104 N.J. 571, 576-80 (1986). When
recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the
actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a
risk of which he would have been aware had he been
sober, such unawareness is immaterial. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-
8b.
Voluntary intoxication was evidence of extreme
indifference to human life to support a conviction of
aggravated manslaughter. State v. Bogus, 223 N.J. 409,
419 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 567 (1988).
Where a diagnosed mental condition required
ingestion of prescription medication which, when
combined with alcohol, affected cognitive abilities, it was
the combination of drugs and alcohol, not the mental
condition, which caused the “highly intoxicated state.” A
defendant cannot under these circumstances avail
himself of a charge on the defense of diminished capacity
to contravene the Legislative prohibition on self-induced
or voluntary intoxication as a defense for a crime premised
on recklessness or negligence. State v. Kotter, 271 N.J.
Super. 214, 219 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 313
(1994).
B. Pathological Intoxication
“Pathological” intoxication means intoxication
grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the
intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he is
susceptible. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8e(3). It is a severe
intoxication which the actor had no reason to expect and
which happened because of some underlying organic
condition. State v. Holzman, 176 N.J. Super. 590 (Law
Div. 1980).
Pathological or involuntary (not self-induced)
intoxication is a complete defense which absolves a
defendant from criminal liability. It is an affirmative
defense so that the defendant has the burden to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the intoxication was
involuntary in that it was either not self-induced or was
unexpected in nature and that the level of intoxication
rose to the M’Naughten standard, that is, the level of the
intoxication was such that it prevented the defendant
from knowing the nature and quality of his acts or from
knowing that those acts were wrong. State v. Sette, 259
N.J. Super. 156, 169-71 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130
N.J. 597 (1992).
There is no pathological intoxication defense when
intoxication results from the combination of voluntary
ingestion of illegal intoxicants, or of legal intoxicants from
which the actor should reasonably expect an adverse
reaction, such as an overdose, or both, and a pathological
hypersensitivity to those intoxicants. State v. Sette, 259
N.J. Super. 156, 179 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J.
597 (1992).
II. JURY CHARGE AND ITS BASIS
Jury charge on intoxication is required only when
facts “clearly indicate” a rational basis to conclude that
defendant suffered from a “prostration of faculties” to
render him incapable of forming the requisite mental
state to commit the crime. State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J.
402, 418-19 (1990); State v. Cameron, 104 N.J. 42, 53-
56 (1986).
When intoxication is an issue, the jury must be
instructed how the defense relates to each charge.
Therefore, where the court instructs the jury on
voluntary intoxication as a defense to a charge of knowing
and purposeful murder, it must also instruct the jury that
voluntary intoxication is not a defense to aggravated
manslaughter or manslaughter. To determine whether
defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and
unjustifiable risk, the jury must view defendant’s
conduct objectively, as if he were sober. State v. Warren,
104 N.J. 571, 577-78 (1986).
The trial court correctly refused to instruct on
intoxication where the facts demonstrated that murder
defendant was not only able to function during the hour
preceding the murder, but also to prepare for the