cdTOCtest

homicide. State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 418-20
(1990).

There was no error in refusing to give an intoxication
charge where expert testified that capital murder
defendant was “a drug-dependent person who on [the
day of the murder] had sunk into a delusional state,” and
there was evidence that defendant had stolen and used a
gram of methamphetamine on the day of the crime, but
where there was no evidence of intoxicant-induced
prostration of faculties on the murder date. State v. Zola,
112 N.J. 384, 423-25 (1988).

Evidence of heavy drinking, without more, does not
warrant an intoxication instruction. Where witness
testified that defendant did not appear to be intoxicated,
where defendant’s testimony reflected a clear and
detailed recollection of events, and where there was no
expert testimony about the probable effect of the alcohol
defendant had consumed, the trial court did not err in
not giving the charge sua sponte. State v. Micheliche, 220
N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 109 N.J. 40
(1987).

Trial court properly refused an intoxication charge
where defendant had consumed less than a pint of wine
and her trial testimony, which containing conclusory
statements as to her own alleged intoxication, reflected
explicit and specific recall of all the details of the assault
as she explained she allegedly acted in self-defense. State
v. Cameron, 104 N.J. 42 (1986).

Where the record in a murder prosecution indicated
that defendant shared a half pint of vodka with her co-
felon prior to the murder, that she had total recall of the
circumstances surrounding the killing, and that she went
back to the car for another drink to regain her initial
nerve, sua sponte charge on intoxication was not
warranted. The court found a logical inconsistency for
defendant, who claimed that she was so intoxicated that
she could not form the intent to kill, to make the rational
decision to take another drink because she was afraid of
what she was doing and had to get her “nerves back up.”
State v. Moore, 178 N.J. Super. 417 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 87 N.J. 406 (1981).

JOINDER & SEVERANCEJOINDER & SEVERANCEJOINDER & SEVERANCEJOINDER & SEVERANCEJOINDER & SEVERANCE

I. OFFENSES IN THE SAME INDICTMENT OR

ACCUSATION

A. Permissive joinder of offenses

Joinder of two or more offenses in the same

indictment or accusation is permitted, but not required,

if the offenses are “of the same or similar character” or

based on the same act or transaction connected together

or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. R.

3:7-6. See State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 451(1998).

R. 3:15-1(a) authorizes joinder of two or more

indictments or accusations if the offenses and the

defendants, if there are 2 or more, “could have been

joined in a single indictment or accusation”.

B. Mandatory Joinder of Offenses

Two or more offenses shall be joined in the same

indictment if the offenses are based upon “the same

conduct” or arise “from the same episode” and if such

offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting

attorney at the time of the commencement of the trial and

are within the jurisdiction and venue of a single court. R.

3:15-1(b); N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8b. See State v. Catanoso, 269

N.J. Super. 246, 272 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J.

563 (1993) (although court rule and statute have slightly

different terminology, there is no substantive difference

when applying them).

The genesis of this statute and rule is State v. Gregory,

66 N.J. 510 (1975). The purposes of mandatory joinder

are not grounded upon constitutional considerations,

but upon notions of fundamental fairness, economy, and

reasonable expectations. State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679,

704-07 (1989); State v. Godfrey, 139 N.J. Super. 135,

141 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 73 N.J. 40 (1976).

For purposes of mandatory joinder, the determina-

tive question is “whether defendant’s criminal activity

constituted criminal offenses based on the same conduct,

or arising from the same criminal episode.” State v.

Catanoso, 269 N.J. Super. at 273. In addressing this

issue, courts should apply a flexible approach considering

the nature of the offenses, the time and place, whether the

evidence submitted on one charge is necessary or

sufficient to convict on another, whether one indictment

is an integral part of a larger scheme, the intent of the

accused, and the consequences of the criminal actions.