LaRoche, Inc., 142 N.J. 356, 373-76 (1995); see also
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 22-38
(1984).
- When a post-impanelment motion to question
the jury about exposure to midtrial publicity is
presented, the trial court should analyze the merits of
counsel’s proffer through a two-part inquiry. First, it
should examine the disseminated information to
determine if it has the capacity to prejudice defendant.
The timing of the media coverage, reports of inculpatory
physical evidence or a confession that has been
suppressed, or publicity regarding a prior conviction or
pending indictment are some factors that could “gravely
prejudice defendant’s right to a fair trial. State v. Bey, 112
N.J. 45, 85 (1988); State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. at - Second, if the court determines that the published
information has the capacity to prejudice the defense, it
should decide whether a realistic possibility exists that
such information may have reached one or more of the
jurors. If so, the court should voir dire each juror to
ascertain whether actual exposure has occurred. Those
jurors exposed to media coverage should be questioned
individually to establish whether they could continue in
their capacity as impartial triers of fact. State v. Bey, 112
N.J. at 86-87; State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. at 487.
Where defendant is charged with committing
aggravated assaults and terroristic threats against his wife,
the trial court properly handled possible jury
contamination by a local newspaper article concerning
wife-beating. The court designated the potentially
tainted jurors as alternates, who ultimately did not
participate in deliberations. State v. McBride, 213
N.J.Super. 255, 274 (App. Div. 1986).
C. Change of Venue
- In capital proceedings, standard to apply in
determining propriety of change of venue is whether
change is necessary to overcome realistic likelihood of
prejudice from pretrial publicity. State v. Biegenwald,
126 N.J. 1, 22-27 (1991); State v. Bey, 96 N.J. 625, 630
(1984). - Test for whether change of venue required due to
pretrial publicity is if impartial jury could be obtained
from citizens of county or whether they had been “so
aroused as to be disqualified.” State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J.
413, 420, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1043 (1969).
X. CONTENT OF DELIBERATIONS
A. Generally- Jurors take an oath to follow the law as charged,
and are expected to follow it. With few exceptions, once
the jury has heard the evidence and the case has been
submitted, the litigants must accept the jury’s collective
judgment. Courts have always resisted inquiring into the
jury’s thought processes. United States v. Powell, 469
U.S. 57, 66-67 (1984); see McDonough Power Equipment
v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984); State v. Bisaccia, 319
N.J.Super. at 17. - The jury’s fact-finding function is all-inclusive
and encompasses the evaluation of witness credibility and
the weight and worth of evidence. State v. Ingenito, 87
N.J. 204, 211 (1981); State v. Branch, 301 N.J.Super.
307, 320-21 (App. Div. 1997), rev’d o.g. 155 N.J. 317
(1998). Jurors are free to accept or reject, in whole or in
part, any aspect of testimonial evidence based on
credibility. State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 43 (1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 950 (1966); State v. Pickett, 241
N.J.Super. 259, 266-67 (App. Div. 1990). - Jurors generally cannot testify about their mental
processes leading to a verdict. State v. Grey, 147 N.J. 4,
39-40 (1996); State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. at 494- - Though the trial judge cannot examine the jurors’
thought processes in reaching a verdict, evidence can be
received as to the existence of conditions or the occurrence
of events to determine whether they had prejudicial
impact on the verdict. State v. Levitt, 36 N.J. 266, 271
(1961); State v. Riley, 216 N.J.Super. 383, 392 (App.
Div. 1987).
No inflexible rule, however, can be employed
because cases do arise where “the plainest principles of
justice” demand that an inquiry be made, State v.
Koedatich, 112 N.J. at 288, but the law raises a privilege
against disclosure of jurors’ communications during
deliberations, which will yield only to “some greater
public need.” State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97, 106 (1964);
see State v. Phillips, 322 N.J.Super. 429, 441 (App. Div.
1999); State v. Baker, 310 N.J.Super. 128, 136 (App.
Div. 1998). A mistrial may be granted in the court’s
discretion if it learns a juror has expressed his or her view
with apparent finality to fellow jurors or persists in
premature discussions with them despite the court’s
contrary instructions. State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. at 109;
State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. at 489-90. Inquiry into
possible bias of a juror, and whether he or she manifested
such bias in considering the case, will be made only upon