sufficient preliminary showing that the juror carried
prejudice into the jury room. Green v. New Jersey
Manufacturers Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 496-98 (1999);
State v. LaFera,, 42 N.J. at 110.
- A trial judge has discretion to return the jurors for
further deliberations after they announce their inability
to arrive at a verdict. State v. Harris, 156 N.J. at 184; State
v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392 (1980). They may do so for a
reasonable period of time before declaring a deadlock.
State v. Hightower, 146 N.J. 239, 258 (1996).
B. Examples
- Content of a single newspaper article appearing
after defendant’s conviction and sentencing, which
quoted several jurors as knowing of his involvement in
another murder, is hearsay and cannot be the sole basis for
the extraordinary procedure of a post-trial juror
interrogation. State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. at 289. - Mistrial can be declared after only two and a half
hours of deliberations where the jury repeatedly
informed the court that it was hopelessly deadlocked.
The courts determine on a case-by-case basis whether
“reasonable time for deliberation has been allowed”
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-9d(2), and the trial judge’s
decision in this regard will be upset only for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Paige, 256 N.J.Super. 362, 380 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 17 (1992); State v. Roach,
222 N.J.Super. 122, 128-29 (App. Div. 1987), certif.
denied, 110 N.J. 317 (1988). - Trial court properly refused to recall jurors and
question them based on a letter sent to court by a woman
who knew both defendant and the decedent personally.
The letter, which recounted a conversation she had with
a juror shortly after the trial’s conclusion, was
inadmissible hearsay. Moreover, any discussions the
jurors had among themselves while considering the
verdict could not be used to impeach their finding. State
v. Freeman, 223 N.J.Super. 92 , 120-21 (App. Div.
1988), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 525 (1989). - Although the jurors’ betting on the verdict’s
anticipated time and date was wrong, nothing in the
record suggests that the $14 or $15 betting pool
influenced, or had a tendency to influence, the verdict
reached. Id. at 116-20. - R. 1:16-1, which prohibits an attorney from
questioning jurors following trial except by leave of court
upon a finding of good cause, applies only to willful,
investigatory efforts and does not prohibit an inadvertent
meeting with a juror whose comments were unsolicited.
State v. Riley, 216 N.J.Super. at 386-90. Here post-trial
information that a juror volunteered regarding his
personal bias against defendant convicted of murder was
admissible at an evidentiary hearing because it did not
relate to details of jury deliberations but, rather, only to
the entirely improper reasons on which the juror based
his guilty vote. Thus defense counsel’s violation of R.
1:16-1 did not automatically exclude the information
revealed as a result. State v. Scher, 278 N.J.Super. at 258-
62 (sins of defense counsel in violating R. 1:16-1 will not
be visited upon defendant); State v. Riley, 216 N.J.Super.
at 390.- Personal threats by one juror to another during
deliberations that did not overbear the juror’s will, but
rather which caused no more than mere discomfort,
would not provide a basis for reversing the jury’s verdict.
State v. Williams, 213 N.J.Super. 30, 34-35 (App. Div.
1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 104 (1987).
XI. DEFENDANT’S APPEARANCE BEFORE
JURY
A. RestraintsThe trial court has the discretion to keep defendant
manacled or otherwise restrained, but only upon a strong
showing of necessity. Where the court determines that
defendant must be handcuffed or shackled, the jury
should be instructed to give such restraint no
consideration in assessing the proofs and determining
guilt. State v. Mance, 300 N.J.Super. at 50-52; see State v.
Damon, 286 N.J.Super. 492, 496-99 (App. Div. 1996);
State v. Roberts, 86 N.J.Super. 159, 165 (App. Div.
1965).B. Jurors’ View of RestraintsBrief exposure of jurors to handcuffed defendant in
hallway not sufficiently prejudicial to impair right to fair
trial. State v. Jones, 130 N.J.Super. 596 (Law Div. 1974).C. Prison ClothingThe State cannot compel an accused to stand trial
before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes,
but failure to object constitutes waiver. Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-14 (1976); see State v.
Coon, 314 N.J.Super. 426, 434-35 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 157 N.J. 543 (1998).