intervention units provide a procedure to deal with those
juvenile matters (i.e., chronic truancy, a serious conflict
between parent and child, or unauthorized absence from
the home) which do not result in delinquent acts, but
which are sufficiently serious to necessitate intervention.
Behavior by a juvenile which under the 1974 statute
identified him as a JINS will, in many but not all cases,
warrant juvenile-family crisis intervention. While the
determination that a juvenile was in need of supervision
under the 1974 statute was based totally on the conduct
of the juvenile, the present statutory scheme views the
juvenile’s conduct as part of the family condition, and
treatment is structured to treat the juvenile problem
within the family context. See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-22 (for a
definition of juvenile family crisis); N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-76
through 91. In ordering disposition in a juvenile-family
crisis matter, the court may utilize some of the non-
restrictive forms of disposition available for delinquents;
however, a juvenile involved in a juvenile-family crisis
may not be committed to an institution used for
delinquents or placed in any physically restrictive facility,
with the exception of mental hospitals, institutions
utilized for the mentally retarded or for the care of
narcotics addicts. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-46. Similarly, a
juvenile who is taken into short-term protective custody
(see N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-31) may not be held in a detention
facility or jail. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-32.
In this respect, in State in the Interest of M.S., 73 N.J.
238 (1977), decided under the 1974 statute, the
Supreme Court determined that a juvenile who, without
permission, leaves a JINS shelter where he was placed by
court order, may not be found delinquent for escape. The
unauthorized departure from a non-restrictive JINS
facility was held to warrant only a JINS adjudication.
However, the Court’s ruling in this case did not preclude
a delinquency adjudication for unauthorized departure
by a youth from a physically restrictive detention facility
where he was being held on an existing delinquency
charge. See State in the Interest of R.L.P., 159 N.J. Super.
267 (App. Div. 1978).
State in the Interest of J.S., 266 N.J. Super. 423 (Ch.
Div. 1993), held that a status offender participating in a
juvenile-family crisis intervention who knowingly
violated a juvenile court’s curfew order could be charged
with criminal contempt, thereby effectively elevating the
juvenile from status offender to delinquent.
- Extradition
In State in the Interest of D.N.H., 147 N.J. Super. 1
(App. Div. 1977), a 17 year old resident of New Jersey
was charged as an adult in Pennsylvania with the
commission of criminal offenses in the latter state. Upon
his return to New Jersey, a requisition warrant was issued
by the Pennsylvania Court, certifying that since
defendant was charged with murder, a crime for which
one is generally treated as an adult in that state, the
Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction did not attach. Therefore,
a warrant was issued for defendant by the State of New
Jersey. In a subsequent proceeding, the New Jersey
Juvenile Court ruled that extradition should be granted,
and defendant was extradited as an adult to Pennsylvania.
On appeal, defendant challenged the extradition,
claiming a denial of due process based upon the New
Jersey Juvenile Court’s failure to conduct a preliminary
hearing in order to determine his status as a juvenile or
adult. Rejecting his contention, the Appellate Division
ruled that no such determination was necessary. Since
defendant had received all that he was entitled to, viz, an
appropriate extradition hearing, at which he was
represented by counsel, his complaints were barred.C. Extra-Territorial JurisdictionIn State in the Interest of D.B.S., 137 N.J. Super. 371
(App. Div. 1975), certif. denied, 70 N.J. 144 (1976), the
juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for the perpetration
of a property offense upon a private residence located in
Fort Dix, over which exclusive control had been ceded to
the United States. Rejecting the youth’s contention that
a New Jersey court did not have jurisdiction over crimes
committed within such an enclave, the Appellate
Division held that jurisdiction was properly vested in this
state’s Juvenile Court. Although the youth was subject
to punishment in the courts of the United States,
pursuant to federal law, a tribunal of this state could
assume jurisdiction over such minors, where in the best
interest of the juvenile, and the United States Attorney of
the district agrees to forego prosecution and surrender the
youth to the jurisdiction of the state. The act of the Fort
Dix federal authorities in bringing the petition against
the juvenile was interpreted as the equivalent of such a
surrender. Moreover, although the youth resided on
federal property, he received educational, as well as
numerous other benefits from the surrounding
community. Thus he was entitled to take advantage of
the state’s rehabilitative juvenile laws.In re Olcott, 141 N.J. Eq. 8 (Ch. 1947), reached the
opposite conclusion. In that case, the juvenile, a resident
of a neighboring state, visited New Jersey only for a few
hours, all the while intending to return to her domicile.
Since she was not charged with the commission of a
criminal offense within the borders of this state, the New