child. Accord, State in the Interest of J.M., 103 N.J. Super.
88 (J. & D.R. Ct. 1968).
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Under
District of Columbia law, a juvenile has a right to counsel
at a hearing at which jurisdiction may be involuntarily
waived to adult criminal court. It is unclear, however,
whether this ruling was of constitutional import, but
while the constitutional stature of such a right has not
been conclusively established in New Jersey, the State
Supreme Court has required a waiver hearing with
counsel even prior to the Kent decision. State v. Lueder, 74
N.J. 62 (1977); State v. Tuddles, 38 N.J. 565, 572-573
(1962); State v. Van Buren, 29 N.J. 548, 554-558
(1959).
State in the Interest of G.J., 108 N.J. Super. 186 (App.
Div. 1969), certif. denied, 55 N.J. 447 (1970). Where a
juvenile is institutionally committed as the result of a
violation of probation imposed as the disposition of a
matter which had been listed on the informal calendar,
the juvenile’s right to counsel is satisfied if he is
represented in the probation violation hearing even if he
was not represented in the hearing on the original charge.
- Waiver
State in the Interest of R.M., 105 N.J. Super. 372 (J. &
D.R. Ct. 1969), concluded that a juvenile may
understandingly and knowingly waive his right to
counsel. It is a factual matter to be decided by the trial
judge in consideration of such factors as the age,
education, mental capacity, background and experience
of the juvenile. [Note - see N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-39 regarding
standards for the waiver of rights.] Here, a waiver of
counsel was upheld where the juvenile was over 17, had
been consistently promoted in school and had completed
ninth grade even though he was a slow learner, who was
mentally competent, who had been employed in various
jobs since leaving school, and had prior court experience.
C. Fourth Amendment
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733,
83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), explained that the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures applies to searches conducted by public school
officials. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that school officials need not obtain a warrant
before searching a student who is under their authority.
Furthermore, the school officials need not adhere to a
requirement that the searches be based upon probable
cause. Rather, the legality of the search of a student
should depend simply on the reasonableness of the search
under all the circumstances. Under ordinary
circumstances, a search will be justified at its inception
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up evidence that the student has violated
or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.
Such a search will be permissible in scope when the
measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the
student’s age and sex and the nature of the infraction.State in the Interest of J.G., 227 N.J. Super. 324 (Ch.
Div. 1988). A juvenile involved in a juvenile-family crisis
who is taken into custody is not distinguishable from a
juvenile taken into custody for delinquency for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Here, a police officer received a
call from the juvenile’s mother informing him that the
juvenile had run away and had drug and alcohol
problems. The juvenile was already under a “one-year
adjustment” disposition. The officer later observed the
juvenile on a highway and took him into short-term
custody as a runaway in accord with prior directions from
the crisis intervention unit. The officer patted him down
prior to transporting him, and discovered a bag of
marijuana in his pocket. No Fourth Amendment
violation was found.In State in the Interest of R.H., 170 N.J. Super. 518 (J.
& D.R. Ct. 1979), the court addressed the question
whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the admission
in a juvenile delinquency proceeding of evidence seized
from a probationer by her probation officer without a
search warrant or probable cause to justify a warrantless
search. The juvenile had signed an acknowledgment of
probation form requiring her to refrain from committing
crimes, avoid injurious habits, answer all reasonable
inquiries, and cooperate with the probation department
in its efforts to help her maintain a satisfactory standard
of conduct. The court held that the juvenile did not
waive her constitutional rights as to search and seizure by
signing such form. Thus, absent probable cause the
warrantless search could not be justified by the juvenile’s
status as a probationer.D. Fifth Amendment- Application of Miranda v. Arizona
State ex rel. O.F., 327 N.J. Super. 102 (App. Div.
1999); State in the Interest of B.T., 145 N.J. Super. 268
(App. Div. 1976), certif. denied, 73 N.J. 49 (1977); State
in the Interest of J.P.B., 143 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div.
1976). The requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384