- Corroboration of a Juvenile’s Confession
State in the Interest of Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 245 (1966);
State in the Interest of J.F. 286 N.J. Super. 89, 102 (App.
Div. 1995); State in the Interest of J.P.B., 143 N.J. Super.
96, 111-112 (App. Div. 1976); State in the Interest of
A.B.M., 125 N.J. Super. 162, 169-170 (App. Div.), aff’d
o.b. 63 N.J. 531 (1973); State in the Interest of W.J., 116
N.J. Super. 462, 469-471 (App. Div. 1971); State in the
Interest of B.D., 110 N.J. Super. 585, 595-596 (App. Div.
1969), aff’d o.b. 56 N.J. 325 (1970). Since juveniles are
more susceptible to influence than adults, a higher
quantum of corroboration is required. The
trustworthiness of a statement made by a minor must be
demonstrated by a showing that its particulars were not
the product of suggestion by the authorities.
Corroboration has been deemed insufficient where
substantial inconsistencies exist between the State’s
proofs and the confession, or if the police first advise the
suspect of all major details of the crime and the eventual
confession contains no information not supplied by the
interrogators. See State in the Interest of J.F., supra; State
in the Interest of J.P.B., supra; State in the Interest of W.J.,
supra. A finding of inadequate corroboration has also
been coupled with serious questions about the
voluntariness or trustworthiness of the youth’s
admissions. State in the Interest of W.J., supra; State in the
Interest of B.D., supra. For instance, in B.D., the youth
asserted that he confessed only to get the police “off his
back” after they had persistently questioned him on six
prior occasions, and had revealed all the details of the
offense to him. Thus, the minor’s inculpatory statement,
which failed to embellish the previously disclosed
information and conflicted with the evidence, was found
inherently lacking in reliability. The opposite
conclusion was reached in A.B.M., where the confession
was obtained under circumstances indicating its
trustworthiness and voluntariness, was not preceded by
repetitious questioning, and was confirmed by
independent proof.
- Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966). Juvenile proceedings
which may lead to a youth’s confinement are considered
criminal for purposes of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Thus, this privilege applies to a hearing
as a result of which a youth may face institutionalization.
State in the Interest of L.M., 56 N.J. 358 (1970); State
in the Interest of D.A.M., 132 N.J. Super. 192 (App. Div.
1975). A juvenile’s failure to testify may not be utilized
to create an inference of guilt. Therefore, comments by
the Juvenile Court suggesting that an adverse inference
may be drawn from such silence are tantamount to plain
error.State in the Interest of A.L., 271 N.J. Super. 192 (App.
Div. 1994), upheld the constitutionality of the juvenile
waiver statute, and in particular that portion which
places upon the juvenile the burden of demonstrating the
probability of his rehabilitation by age 19. N.J.S.A.
2A:4A-26a(3) neither compels a juvenile to testify at a
waiver hearing, nor requires an admission of guilt by the
juvenile, or any witness on his behalf, as a pre-condition
for the case remaining in the Family Part. Even assuming
an admission of guilt is impliedly required, that
admission has no adverse legal consequences since fully
immunized by N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-29. Thus, there is no
Fifth Amendment violation of the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. Nor does the statute
violate equal protection or due process. (Rejecting State v.
Y.B., 264 N.J. Super. 423 (Ch. Div. 1993), which had
concluded N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26a(3) unconstitutionally
violated a juvenile’s Fifth Amendment rights against
compelled self-incrimination.)E. Due ProcessIn re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); State in the Interest of
H.M.T., 159 N.J. Super. 104 (App. Div. 1978); State in
the Interest of W.M., 147 N.J. Super. 24 (App. Div. 1977);
State in the Interest of D.A.M., 132 N.J. Super. 192 (App.
Div. 1975); State in the Interest of C.B., 163 N.J. Super.
215 (J. & D.R. Ct. 1978); State in the Interest of J.S., 132
N.J. Super. 464 (J. & D.R.Ct. 1975). Juveniles are
entitled to the same due process standards as afforded
adults, to the extent consistent with the basic
rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile process. See also
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-40. Due process mandates that juvenile
delinquency proceedings measure up to the essentials of
due process and fundamental fairness. To satisfy this
requirement, adequate and timely notice of such hearings
must be given to the youth so that reasonable
examination of witnesses is also extended to minors.In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); State in the Interest of
L.N., 109 N.J. Super. 278, 284 (App. Div. 1970), aff’d
o.b. 57 N.J. 165 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1009
(1971); State in the Interest of J.J., 132 N.J. Super. 464 (J.
& D.R. Ct. 1975); State in the Interest of L.B., 99 N.J.
Super. 589, 595 (J. & D.R. Ct. 1968). Since it is only
necessary to charge a youth with wrongful conduct, a
juvenile complaint need not be drawn with the same
exactitude as its adult counterpart. However, the