cdTOCtest

complaint must set forth the alleged offense with
particularity. A vague allegation of misconduct is
inadequate to support charges against a juvenile. To
comport with due process, the youth must be given
sufficient notice of the facts constituting the alleged
offense. (See N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-30a(3); R. 5:20-1).

State in the Interest of K.A.W., 104 N.J. 112 (1986).
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-30a(3) and R. 5:20-1a(3), requiring the
date and time of an alleged offense to be included in a
juvenile complaint are not to be read literally in their
application to sexual assault offenses committed against
child victims; their purpose (and due process) is fulfilled
if the complaint sets forth sufficient information to
permit a juvenile to plan and assert his defense, for literal
application of the date and time provisions would
effectively preclude prosecution of those who have
sexually abused children who are unable to specify the
date. The State is not required to specify one or more
exact dates to give the juvenile adequate notice to permit
him to prepare a defense, but the trial court must balance
all the existing circumstances to determine whether “fair
notice” has been given.

State in the Interest of A.R., 57 N.J. 71 (1970); State
in the Interest of J.M., 57 N.J. 442, 444-445 (1971); State
in the Interest of A., 130 N.J. Super. 138, 140 (App. Div.
1974).

Although in delinquency cases, the law upon which
the juvenile’s alleged violation is based should be
specified, failure to do so does not warrant dismissal of the
complaint if the juvenile has not been misled thereby to
his prejudice. So long as the charges in the complaint are
readily understandable and the factual allegations
precise, the requirements of due process are satisfied.
Even the miscitation of a statute on a complaint is not
fatal unless the juvenile is prejudiced thereby. (See
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-30a(4); R. 5:20-1.)

F. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 357 (1970); State in the
Interest of S.H., 61 N.J. 108, 116 (1972); State in the
Interest of R.S., 132 N.J. Super. 200, 203 (App. Div.
1975); State in the Interest of J.M., 110 N.J. Super. 337,
339 (App. Div. 1970), rev’d o.g., 57 N.J. 442 (1971);
State in the Interest of M.P.C., 152 N.J. Super. 519, 530-
531 (J. & D.R. Ct. 1977); State in the Interest of B.H., 112
N.J. Super. 1, 4 (J. D.R.Ct. 1970). In delinquency
proceedings, the State is required to prove the charges
beyond a reasonable doubt.

G. Speedy Trial

State in the Interest of H.M.T., 159 N.J. Super. 104

(App. Div. 1978), held that juveniles are entitled to the

Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The speedy

trial rights of a nondetained juvenile are to be determined

by application of the balancing test of Barker v. Wingo,

407 U.S. 514 (1972), with special consideration to be

given by the Juvenile Court to the effect of dismissal or

non-dismissal on the rehabilitative aspect of the juvenile

justice system. The failure to file a complaint “forthwith”

as required by (prior) R. 5:9-2(e) after a juvenile has been

taken into custody, should not result in the automatic

vitiation of further proceedings when the juvenile has

been promptly released and is not further detained.

Nevertheless, an unreasonable delay in the filing of a

juvenile complaint may constitute a violation of the

juvenile’s due process rights.

In State in the Interest of C.B., 173 N.J. Super. 424

(App. Div. 1980), the right of the juvenile to a speedy

trial was not denied where the juvenile, who was detained

for 35 days after arrest, then released, was brought to trial

about three and one-half months after arrest. The first

scheduled adjudicatory hearing was postponed at the

request of the juvenile’s own counsel, and prejudice to the

juvenile was neither asserted nor shown. See also State in

the Interest of G.T., 143 N.J. Super. 73, 81 (App. Div.

1976), aff’d o.b. 75 N.J. 378 (1978) (a two and one-half

month delay between the offense and the jurisdictional

waiver hearing did not deny a juvenile’s speedy trial

rights).

H. Jury Trial

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 402 U.S. 441 (1971); In re

J.W., 57 N.J. 144 (1970). Since the jury is not a

necessary component of accurate fact finding, jury trials

are not mandated in juvenile proceedings. Imposing such

a requirement upon the juvenile process would remake

hearings into a fully adversary process and would destroy

its informal protective approach. Thus, the efficacy of the

separate and unique juvenile system would be destroyed.

See also N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-40.

I. Statute of Limitations

State in the Interest of B.H., 112 N.J. Super. 1 (J &

D.R.Ct. 1970), held the defense of statute of limitations

applicable to juvenile cases. Since the complaint in B.H.

had been filed more than one year after the disorderly

persons offense, the lapse of the one year statute of