limitations applicable to such offenses mandated its
dismissal.
J. Sequestration of Witnesses
State in the Interest of W.O., 100 N.J. Super. 358 (App.
Div. 1968); State in the Interest of B.H., 112 N.J. Super.
1 (J. D.R.Ct. 1970). The procedural tool of
sequestration of witnesses is available to juvenile
defendants.
K. Insanity Defense
State in the Interest of R.G.W., 135 N.J. Super. 125
(App. Div. 1975), aff’d o.b. 70 N.J. 185 (1976).
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:1-60 (now N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-40)
which applies all adult defenses to delinquency
proceedings, juveniles have every right to the defense of
insanity. In this respect, State in the Interest of H.C., 106
N.J. Super. 583 (J. D.R.Ct. 1969), decided prior to the
enactment of the above statute, was specifically
overruled. In determining whether to grant a hearing to
determine the sanity vel non of a juvenile at the time of the
offense when he has been adjudged unable to stand trial
by reasons of insanity, the court must not only consider
the youth’s interest in terms of criminal stigma, but must
also consider the possibility of indefinite incarceration,
and his right to avoid, in proper circumstances, the
necessity to defend a complaint years later after much of
the evidence pertinent to the issue of insanity at the time
of the offense may have been lost. (See also N.J.S.A. 2C:4-
1, 2, 6, 7, replacing N.J.S.A. 2A:163-2.)
L. Double Jeopardy
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), invalidated the
California statutory scheme, pursuant to which a youth
was first tried in Juvenile Court, and, upon a finding that
he had violated a criminal statute, and a subsequent
determination that he was unfit for treatment as a
juvenile, was retried as an adult for the very same offense.
The United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment’s proscription against double jeopardy
applies to juvenile proceedings. Jeopardy was found to
attach upon the inception of the juvenile proceedings,
i.e., upon the presentation of evidence during the
adjudicatory hearing. Nevertheless, the Court’s holding
only invalidated waiver decisions made after an
adjudication of guilt in the Juvenile Court and
subsequent retrials in adult court. No limitation was
placed upon the transfer of juveniles to the adult criminal
process where no finding of guilt in the Juvenile Court
preceded the waiver.
In State in the Interest of J.J., 132 N.J. Super. 464 (J.
& D.R. Ct. 1975), the youth pleaded guilty to breaking
and entering and larceny at an informal hearing without
counsel, whereupon he was placed on probation.
Subsequently, he was charged with violation of
probation. In addition to a probation violation hearing,
the Juvenile Court (a different judge) held a formal
adjudicatory hearing with an attorney, on the original
breaking and entering and larceny charges, in the event
of the youth’s institutionalization, which could only
result if he was represented by counsel. This procedure
was upheld as not constituting double jeopardy. Cf.
Breed v. Jones, supra.State in the Interest of S.Z., 177 N.J. Super. 32 (App.
Div. 1981). At the conclusion of the State’s case, the
Juvenile Court erroneously granted the juveniles’
untimely motions for dismissal on the ground that the
acts alleged did not constitute a violation of the criminal
mischief statute. The Appellate Division reversed and
found that a retrial would not violate the double jeopardy
rights of the juveniles because had the dismissal motions
been properly made, they would not have been
considered during trial. Further, there had been no
verdict of acquittal on the facts.In State in the Interest of L.D., 174 N.J. Super. 263
(App. Div. 1980), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 122 (1980), the
State was absent from a proceeding in the Juvenile Court
at which only the juvenile appeared and related his
version of the incident in question. The Appellate
Division held that dismissal of a complaint against the
juvenile after said proceeding did not bar, by reason of
double jeopardy or due process, prosecution of a later
complaint charging the juvenile with the same offense.
The court added that some restraint should be exercised
against a tendency to apply double jeopardy
considerations automatically in a case such as this where
the State did not even present a case.State in the Interest of C.V., 146 N.J. Super. 573 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 74 N.J. 258 (1977). Soon after the
commencement of testimony in an informal (no counsel)
adjudicatory hearing in this case, the Juvenile Court
considered the possible institutionalization of the youth,
and therefore, declared a mistrial sua sponte. Thereupon
the case was transferred to another judge who then held
a formal hearing at which the youth was represented by
counsel. Since no adjudication had been entered at the
first hearing, double jeopardy did not bar the second
hearing.