influence of intoxicating liquor repealed by Alcoholism
Treatment and Rehabilitation Act).
State v. Thomas Kazanes, 318 N.J. Super. 421 (App.
Div. 1999). While sufficient evidence existed that
defendant had engaged in conduct manifesting a purpose
to obtain drugs pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2.1b(2),
there were insufficient proofs that he was “wandering” in
a public place with such an illegal purpose as required
under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2.1b(1) where the evidence
merely showed a meeting and an exchange. The
Legislature enacted this statute to protect the quality of
life in public places, and in using the word “wander” --
and the alternative words “remains” and “prowls” -- it
required some sense of “hanging about” or “lingering” in
an attempt to make a drug connection.
State v. Brian Green, 313 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div.
1998).
Groups of persons cannot be arrested merely for loitering
if not engaged in any illegal activity.
MEDICAIDMEDICAIDMEDICAIDMEDICAIDMEDICAID
Under N.J.S.A. 30:4D-17.a. Any person who willfully obtains benefits under
this act to which he is not entitled or in a greater amount
than that to which he is entitled, and any provider who
receives medical assistance payments to which he is not
entitled or in a greater amount than that to which he is
entitled is guilty of a high misdemeanor and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be liable to a penalty of not more
than $10,000.00 or to imprisonment for not more than
three years or both.b. Any provider, or any person, firm, partnership,
corporation or entity, who:- Knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be
made any false statement or representation of a material
fact in any cost study, claim form, or any document
necessary to apply for or receive any benefit or payment
under this act; or... shall be liable for a penalty of not
more than $10,000.00 for the first and each subsequent
offense or to imprisonment for not more than three years
or both...
In State v. Loughrey, 149 N.J. Super. 264 (App. Div.
1977), a defendant was charged with aiding and abetting
a nursing home in receiving medical assistance payments
in a greater amount than that to which it was entitled
contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 30:4D-17.
Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment based upon
the statute of limitations. At the hearing on the motion,
the State presented evidence which disclosed that the
defendant had prepared a cost study in 1969. That cost
study had subsequently been used in 1971 to obtain
payments. The Appellate Division held that the statute
of limitations did not bar prosecution of the defendant for
unlawfully receiving medicaid funds when the money
was received within the statute of limitations although
the wrongful acts which induced the payment occurred
beyond the statutory period. Thus, where payment was
received within the statutory period, defendant could be
convicted although his participation in the unlawful
scheme occurred prior thereto.Similarly, a course of conduct of obtaining excessive
medicaid assistance payments spanning nine years was
considered a continuous offense and the entire nine year
period was permitted to be encompassed in the
indictment. State v. Tyson, 200 N.J. Super. 137, 150