ACCOMPLICE LIABILITYACCOMPLICE LIABILITYACCOMPLICE LIABILITYACCOMPLICE LIABILITYACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
I. STATUTORY BASIS
The statutory basis for accomplice liability is
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6b sets forth the
situations in which one is legally accountable for the
conduct of another. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6c sets forth the
modes and extent of complicity in criminal behavior.
The subject of vicarious accomplice liability is
governed by different sections of the Code than vicarious
conspiratorial liability and consequently must be
separately analyzed. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6b(3) provides that
“[a] person is legally accountable for the conduct of
another person when ... [h]e is an accomplice of such
other person in the commission of an offense.” Under
N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6c(1)(a) and (b), an accomplice is a person
who, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating
another person in the commission of an offense, aids or
agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or
committing the offense or solicits the other person to
commit the offense. Thus, to be found guilty under a
theory of accomplice liability, a defendant must not only
have the purpose of promoting or facilitating the
commission of a crime but also must have “at least
indirectly participated in the commission of the criminal
act.” State v. Fair, 45 N.J. 77, 95 (1965); accord, State v.
Williams, 263 N.J. Super. 620, 631 (App. Div. 1993),
certif. denied, 134 N.J. 477 (1993). In other words, even
though a defendant may be found guilty under a theory
of conspiratorial liability based solely on an agreement to
commit a crime, a defendant must be shown to have
engaged in conduct designed to aid another in the
commission of a crime to be found guilty under a theory
of accomplice liability, See State v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5,
32 (1997).
II. DEFINITION
“By definition, an accomplice must be a person who
acts with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the
commission of the substantive offense for which he is
charged as an accomplice.” State v. White, 98 N.J. 122,
129 (1984) (emphasis in original). For a defendant to be
culpable as an accomplice, he must have the “conscious
object or design of facilitating” the crime charged. State
v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396, 404 (1987).
A defendant may be found guilty even if the jurors
cannot agree on whether the defendant is a principal,
accomplice, or a co-conspirator. State v. Roach, 146 N.J.
208, 223 (1996).Accomplice liability need not be alleged in the
indictment. If the facts and evidence presented during a
trial indicate a rational basis for an instruction on
accomplice liability, the trial judge can charge
accordingly. Neither party need request such a charge,
so long as the court indicates its intention to charge
accomplice liability before summations. State v. Hakim,
205 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 1985).The aggregate of these principles of accomplice
liability are that, if a defendant acts in concert with
others, the evidence with its legitimate inference can be
sufficient to establish extortion despite the fact that the
defendant did not personally threaten or assault the
victim who is the object of the extortion. State v. Taccetta,
301 N.J. Super. 227, 243-44 (App. Div. 1997), certif.
denied, 152 N.J. 187, 188 (1997).The owner of a car who hires someone to burn that
car may be held legally accountable as an accomplice to
the arsonist. Under pre-Code law an owner could not be
held criminally liable for burning his own car and
defendant here claimed that since he could not be liable
as a principal, he could not be liable as an accomplice.
The Appellate Division noted that even if the pre-Code
law survived the Code, which it doubted, the Legislature
was free to prohibit the owner from soliciting or aiding
another in burning the car even if it did not prohibit the
owner from burning the car himself. State v. Williams,
263 N.J. Super. 620 (App. Div. 1993).A private person may be an accomplice to official
misconduct. State v. Hinds, 143 N.J. 540, 549-50
(1996); State v. Bryant, 257 N.J. Super. 63 (App. Div.
1992).Because both principal and accomplice are equally
guilty of purposeful or knowing murder under New
Jersey’s statutory scheme, accomplice liability murder is
an alternative and not lesser-included form of murder.
State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 39 (1998).To ameliorate the harshness of accomplice liability
for a felony murder, the Code affords a defendant the
affirmative defense that he had “no reasonable ground to
believe that any other participant intended to engage in
conduct likely to result in death or serious physical