exact; rather a general location is sufficient, provided the
checkpoint is otherwise in compliance with the
requirements of Kirk, as to a carefully targeted area at a
specific time and place based upon data justifying the
location selected.
State v. Reynolds, 319 N.J. Super. 426 (App. Div.
1998), reversed the trial court’s suppression of evidence
in defendant’s drunk driving prosecution stemming from
his stop at a township’s DWI roadblock. The police had
established the roadblock at a location where statistics
revealed that many DWI arrests had occurred in the past,
where several fatal accidents had taken place, and near
four bars. Prior warnings were given of the DWI
roadblock’s presence, and the police operated under
specific written guidelines for conducting stops of each
car passing through it, including the handing out of DWI
information literature. Defendant was pulled over for
exuding the odor of alcohol as he stopped at the
roadblock. The Appellate Division was entirely satisfied
that the township’s roadblock was lawfully established
pursuant to caselaw. The police could stop every vehicle
passing through the roadblock without violating the
Fourth Amendment, and could distribute DWI
literature to further deterrence. Also, no factual basis
supported the trial court’s conclusion that the police
procedure caused traffic problems, and the odor of
alcohol on defendant’s breath and his actions constituted
sufficient “suspicion,” and in fact probable cause, to
further detain him.
State v. Flowers, 328 N.J. Super. 205 (App. Div.
2000), reversed the trial court’s order suppressing drugs
and money seized when defendant attempted to evade a
roadblock. As he approached a stolen vehicle checkpoint
defendant stopped his vehicle, backed up, drove the
wrong way down a one-way street, parked, and discarded
cocaine as he walked away from his vehicle; when arrested
he possessed a large sum of money. The trial court ruled
that while the roadblock to check for stolen vehicles was
not per se unconstitutional, the State had failed to prove
the checkpoint’s reasonableness. The appellate court
disagreed, holding that stolen vehicle checkpoints, which
serve important public purposes similar to safety and
DWI checkpoints, may be the basis for a roadblock.
Here, drivers stopped were asked to produce their driving
credentials, and were sent on their way if they were in
order. Thus any intrusion was minimal, and the police
method chosen was both properly conducted and
reasonably related to advancing the State’s interest in
identifying stolen cars in this particular area of Newark.
In fact, the Appellate Division determined that the trial
court could have taken judicial notice -- which the
appellate court did -- of the Newark stolen car problem,
which would have made it unnecessary for the State to
have empirically justified its roadblock site. Because
defendant committed at least one traffic violation in the
officers’ presence, the court found no need to address the
State’s contention that avoiding the roadblock itself gave
the police probable cause to stop him.The continued validity of this decision is
questionable in light of the holding in Indianapolis v.
Edmond, U.S. , 121 S.Ct. 447 (2000), which found
that checkpoints to interdict drugs were unlawful and
unconstitutional under the 4th amendment. The U.S.
Supreme Court concluded that while checkpoints for
drunken driving as in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz,
or to intercept illegal aliens, as in U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte,
were acceptable, the court had not indicated approval of
a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to
detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.In State v. McLendon, 331 N.J. Super. 104 (App. Div.
2000), the Appellate Division remanded for a hearing on
defendant’s motion to suppress the checkpoint,
notwithstanding that defendant had not raised the issue
at the trial court, by pre-trial motion, as required by R.
7:5-2. The issue of the validity of the checkpoint was
raised, sua sponte by the Law Division Judge on the trial
de novo on the record below, R. 3:23-8. In the absence
of a proper pretrial motion to suppress, pursuant to R.
7:5-2, the “State had the right to assume that the validity
of the roadblock was not in issue,” as the validity of a
roadblock is not an element of the offense of drunk
driving, it is more of a jurisdictional issue of fact.H. StatutesState v. Garbin, 325 N.J. Super. 521 (App. Div.
1999), certif. denied 164 N.J. 560 (2000), affirmed a
DWI conviction where the defendant was found in the
driver’s seat of his pickup truck, in the defendant’s garage
with the tires spinning, creating smoke and the front
bumper pushing against the garage wall. Defendant
attempted to rely on the holdings in State v. Sweeney, 40
N.J. 139, 360-361 (1963) and State v. Mulcahy, 107 N.J.
467, 477-478 (1987) for the proposition that he had to
be operating his vehicle on a public highway, not in his
garage. The Appellate Division rejected this claim,
distinguishing the cases relied upon by noting that in
those cases the issue was the intent of the person to
operate within the meaning of the DWI statute, not his
intent to operate on a public highway. The court relied
upon the holdings in State v. Magner, 151 N.J. Super. 451
(App. Div. 1977) and State v. McColley, 157 N.J. Super.